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This thesis deals with the events ~ld issues which 
were connected with the 1935 gubernatorial election. 
There is first a brief sketC!1 of Kentucky politics prior 
to the 1935 election. Particular interest is given to the 
history of the Lemocratic Party and the split which 
occurred in it at the turn of the centur~. 
A ~~eat deal of attention is given to the factional 
struggles which occurred in the period between 1931 and 
1935. The controversy and drive for a primary law is 
discussed in detail. 
Because of the nature of the primary law enacted 1n 
1935 two primary elections were held before the Lemocrat1c 
Party selected its cand idates. 'l'he candidates, issues and 
significance of each primary 1s di8cussed. Also included 
1s an analysis of t he vote g1 ven to the candidates in both 
parties. 
In a like manner, the campaigns of the two guber-
natorial nominees are discussed. The significance of the 
results of the election and the factors which were respon-
sible for its outcome are presented. 
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CHAPThh 1 
PRl!.LUL.I:. TO IISHAl:-~t-l0N'Y 
It was cold And rainy across most of Kentucky as 
voters went to the polls in 1935 to register their choice 
for the state's next governor. Lespite the inclement 
weather a large number of voters turned out, thus climaxing 
one of the bitterest political contests in the history of 
the Commonwealth. Few topics intrigue Kentuckians as much 
as the question of who will be victorious at the next 
election. However, most controversy is concentrated in the 
weeks just prior to the primary and general election. But 
in 1935 voters were subjected to over ten months of almost 
constant political fighting and campaigning. v.:!thin less 
than a year, a special session of the state legislature had 
been called under dramatic circumstances and three elections 
had occurred. Before the events of 1935 can be understood, 
a brief look must be taken at Kentucky's political history. 
Before the Civil War political power had been largely 
vested in the hands of vJhig slaveholders. Much of the Whig 
Party's strength in the state had been oonoentrated in the 
Central Bluegrass region. Not only was the area predomi-
nantly Whig, but it was from this region that most of the 
Party's leaders came. Other areas of Whig strength were 




Al though the 1lhig Party, under the leadership of Henry 
Clay, successfully controlled the state in this period, the 
lemocratic Party was not without support among Kentucky 
voters. The extreme western corner of the state, commonly 
called the Jackson Purchase area, was overwhelmingly Lamo-
cratic. There were aleo pockets of Democratic strength in 
Northern Kentucky along the Ohio River and in a few South-
eastern counties, notably Pike, Carter and }i:orf"an. 
The death of Whig leader Henry Clay, the intensifying 
of the slavery issue and finally the Civil \,'ar all produced 
tfthe necessary solvent to destroy well-fixed political 
habits. ,,1 After the \'''ar Between the States most of the old 
slaveholding Whigs joined the Democratic Party. The Lemo-
cratic Party then became an alliance between the small 
farme~of western and central Kentucky and the Bluegrass 
"Bourbons". During the Civil War and in the years immedi-
ately after the Republican party attracted little support 
in the state. It was at first considered by most to be a 
radical party. After the war the Reconstruction policies 
of the Republican Party made the party even more unpopular 
in the state. But gradually, as the bitterness engendered 
by the conflict faded the Republican Party gradually united 
the mountain Whigs, the emancipated Negroes and some old 
Jacksonian Democrats. However, the Republican coalition 
lJasper B. Shannon and Ruth McQuown, Presidential 
Politics in Kentuck l8~ -19 8 (Lexington: UnIversIty of 
Kentucky Press, 19 0 , p. 3 • 
3 
presented little threat to the powerful lemocratic alliance. 
The only hope for a Republican victory la;y in a split among 
Lemocratic forces. Such a split did not occur for almost 
thirty years. The Democratic coalition was a powerful com-
bination which managed to maintain its ascendancy until 
1895. 
Luring the last decade of the nineteenth century 
Kentuci;:y, like much of the nation, was beset by political 
and social unrest. This was the period when the Populist 
movement was growing and giving expression to the dis-
content of farmers across the South and West. Kentucky as 
an af~icultural state had suffered from the severe decline 
in farm prices. The frustration and discontent of farmers 
with the economic situation had been demonstrated in 1891 
when the Populist candidate for governor of the state had 
polled over twenty-five thousand votes. 2 "This widespread 
suffering among farmers was to have great repercussions in 
Kentucky politics for a number of years. 1t3 
By 1891 the Democratic Party in the state was becom-
ing divided over the silver question. In that year 
conservative Lemocrats successfully opposed the nomination 
of P. Wat Hardin "who they thought was tainted not with 
Populism, but with too much leaning to isms, chief among 
2Judge Charles Kerr (ed.), History of KentDckl 
(Chicago: The American Historical Society, 1922), II, 
1006. 
3Shannon and MCQuown, Presidential Politics, p. 64. 
which was free silver.,,4 Supported by conservative lemo-
crats, John Y. Brown received the nomination and was sub-
sequently elected governor. 
1+ 
Very early in his administration, Gover'nor Brown and 
his Secretary of State broke with the other members of his 
administration. There followed three years of bitter 
factional fighting in the state legislature. In the inter-
vening time between the 1891 and 1895 gubernatorial 
elections, economic conditions in the state had become 
worse as a result of the financial panic of 1893. As the 
panic deepened into a depression the heralds of the free 
ooinage of silver and adoption of bi-metalism preached a 
dootrine which found increasingly receptive ears. Though 
few people understood it, the silver versus gold debate 
dominated the 1895 gubernatorial eleotion. 
In 1895. Hardin once again sought the nomination, but 
this time he ran openly on a free silver platform. 
Although conservative Democrats opposed Hardin again, they 
were unable to defeat him. However, they dId sucoeed in 
having adopted a gold standard platform for him to run on.S 
Still, the opposition to Hardin was great and many of the 
more conservative party members refused to support him. 
The result was that for the first time in the history of 
the state the Republican Party won a [.oubernatorial election. 
4George Lee \~ 111is, Kentucky Democracy (Louisville: 
Lemocratic Historical Soc iety, 19.35) J II, p. 303. 
5.!P.!2.., p, 301.~. 
An even .Q'reater defection 'VJithin the lemocratic Part;y 
.. ' 
occurred the following year in trie preSidential election. 
The Great Commoner, v!illism Jenr;ings Bryan, had tremendous 
appeal for small farmers across most of t:le state. Their 
grievances were many and of long standing. The farmers had 
been hardest hit by the depression. They had also been 
provoked by the cis criminatory practices of the Louisville 
&: Nashville Railroad ar;d by the resentment against what 
they regarded as flHourbon" or BlueGrass domination of the 
Lemocratic Party. To many of these people the issue of 
free silver served as a banner for more than the improve-
ment of their economic conditions. It also became the 
rallying point for those who were dissatisfied with the 
political order. For these very reasons, Bryan antagonized 
and alienated urban dwellers and the descendants of the old 
Whig slaveholders. Enough Lemocrats were fearful of 
Bryants seeming radicalism to give Kentucky's electoral 
vote for the first time to a Republican candidate for 
President. 
In 1896 a majority of Kentucky's Lemocrats were sup-
porters of the Cross of Gold candidate. However, many of 
the party's most influential leaders were opposed to Bryan. 
For the most part these leaders were from the growing 
urban areas and from the wealthy Bluegrass region. They 
included men such as Henry vlatterson, publisher of the 
Courier-Journal, John Y. Brown, and Simon Bolivar Buckner. 
The division between the ngold" and "silver" factions 
6 
in Kentucky's rJ€mocratic Party persisted well into the 
present century. The debate over monetary policy quiokly 
faded as a divisive issue, but the split cont1.nue(l. After 
1896, the silver raotion became the dominant grot~ in the 
party, "'rhile many or those who opposed Bryem combined to 
form the non-I'uling faction. But gradually many of the 
influential leaders who had opposed Bryan became associated 
with the dominant £action. Although some individuals main-
tained steadfastly their allegiance to one faetion, many 
persons moved repeatedly from one side to the other in 
search of politically greener pastures. liespite this, one 
faction had managed by a variety of means to maintain its 
control of the party and stste government since 1896. The 
dissident faction of the party came to be inoreasingly 
composed of young men whose political ambitions had been 
thwarted and by men who had become for some reason, alien-
ated from the ruling group. By 1935 this combination of 
politicians lion the make lf and alienated political veterans 
WliS large enough and powerful enough to defeat what had 
been the dominant faction of the remocratic Party for over 
forty years. Before this political accord wes fashioned, 
however, a great deal of political wrangling had transpired. 
In the period after the election of 1896, "there "HiS 
born a coalition of political leaders who were identified 
wi th the Bourbons t and ~Jhich was kno'to1D as the Bi-Partisan 
Combine. 1I6 As the title nBi-Partisan" ina.ic a. tes, this 
6Sohn E. Fenton, Po11ties in the Border state (New 
orleans: The }Lauaer Press, I9>,n, -P~4b.-~-·--
'l 
coali tion was composed of both Iemocrats and Republioans, 
all of whom espoused a belief in non-partisan government. 
Theoretically, a non-partisan government was one which was 
conducted solely for the well-being of the populace. The 
decisions and actions of its leaders would not be based on 
considerations of party politics. The leaders of the bi-
partisan coalition contenced that non-partisan government 
could be achieved simply by having leaders from both 
parties in important positions in the state Government. In 
reality it did not provide either a more efficient or more 
democratic government. Instead it provided one faction of 
the Democratic Party with the means of maintaining its 
dominance and provided the Republican party with an oppor-
tunity to exercise political power in a state that was 
predominantly Democratic. In practice, the Bi-Partisan 
government proved non-political only in that it mattered 
little to its leaders whether the Republican or Democratic 
Party emerged victorious at the polls. More important than 
party affiliation was the candidate's willingness to follow 
the guidance of the Combinets leaders who were concerned 
solely with perpetuating their own power. 
The political strength of this r~oup developed slowly 
after the turn of the century. By 1915, when the Bi-
Partisan Combine embarked upon twelve years of uninter-
rupted rule, the most powerful political leaders in the 
state operated within its ranks. Among its members were 
remocrats such as Billy Klair, an influential Lexington 
8 
politician, and Herb Smith of Harlan, and Republicans such 
as Morris Calvin of Lexington. These men were "area 
bosses" who wielded great power within their respective 
domains anc were capable of assuring a large vote to any 
candidate supported by the bi-partisan coalition. Most of 
these people were urban politicians. Aoting in ooncert, 
liemocratic and Republioan leaders had learned "that by 
effeotive use of the conoentrated and malleable urban 
voting populace they could effect a victory for either side 
1n a close eleotion, and all elections were close during 
this period of Kentucky's political histor~.ft7 This 
group's control was maintained through the eleotion ot 
governors and state legislators who were willing to submit 
to the direction ot the Combinets leaders. If the Lemo-
cratic nominee proved uncooperative, as was the oase in 
1927, the Combine's leaders merel~ gave their support to 
the Republican candidate. 
But the principal n~ans through which the Combine 
exerted its intluence was the Highway Department. Because 
of the increasing demand for new and better roads after 
World War I, the Highway Department became a center of new 
wealth and power. Its power derived not only from the huge 
sums of money involved in the building and maintenance of 
roads, but also from its allocation Df patronage. Further-
more, the authority of the highway commissioners to 
determine the routes of the various ronde provided them 
7Ibid., pp. If6-47. 
9 
with a means of influencing the legislature and local 
governing bocies. B TJuring the period that the state gov-
ernment was under the control of the bi-partisan group, the 
IIighwl:lJ Comrtlission was composed of four membeI's. two from 
ench of the major political parties. The equal division of 
party members on the Commission supposedly assured 
efficient and honest rnanagement. But in practice, most of 
the highway commissione,rs became represerltatives of the 
area bosses or an important bi-partisan leader and "were a 
unit in promoting their own selfish interests and the 
interests of their J:emocratic and Republican supporters.n9 
With this type of organizational support the bi-
partisan combine was able to maintain its control for 
almost fifteen years. But in 1927 friction developed 
within the coalition which resulted in its dissolution. 
Republicans were largely responsible for the difficulties 
which developed. They proved less non-partisan than their 
l~emocratic counterparts and s.ttempted to exercise a dis-
proportionate amount of power. In so doing they alienated 
the t,emocratic members of the bi-partisan C oe.lition. 
The conflict developed because of a polit1cal feud 
between Ben Johnson and J. C. yO. Beckham, two of Kentucky's 
most prominent Lemocratic pollticians. Feuds of a 
8J. B. Shannon and others, Political Behavior in 
Kentucky 1910-1940 (Lexington: University of kentUCky 
Pre 8 S, 19LJ.3 , p. 8. 
90rval It]. Baylor, J. Lan Tal.bot: Cha~lon of Good 
Government (Louisville: Kentucky Printingorporation, 
i 942), p • 83. 
10 
political nature were not uncommon in the state's history 
but few equaled the Johnson-Beckham feud either in longev-
ity or intensity. The antecedents of the f'eud can be found 
in what were originally the Ben Hardin and Charles Wickliff 
factions of the l.Jemocra tic Party. The strugf:leS between 
these two Nelson county groups had begun in the 1840's and 
the rivalry had continued until Ben Johnson inherited from 
his father the leadership of' the Hardin faction, and 
Beckham in the tradition of his grandfather Charles A. 
Wickliff, became standardbearer for tne House of v.Iickliff. 
Both Ben Johnson and J. C. W. Beckham had begun their 
political careers during the 1890's. Both men at some 
point in their careers had been aligned with each of the 
two factions of the I emocratic Party and thus exemplify the 
oonfusing nature of Kentucky politics prior to the 1935 
gubernatorial election. 
Johnson started his career as a member of the House of 
J<epresentatives in It'rankfort in 1885. "He inmediately 
became an important figure in that body and two years 
later, ••• was elected speaker of' the House. ulO In 1906, 
he was elected to tne Congress of' the United states where 
he served until March 4, 1927.11 After his retirement from 
Congress, Johnson was apPointed to the important position 
of chairman of the highway Commission. This position was 
10Lexington Herald, Lecember 2, 1934, clipping from 
Thomas R. Underwood Collection, Margaret King Library, 
tniversity of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky. 
lllE!.2._ 
11 
offered to him because the Combine at tl~t time was engaged 
in an election campaign against Beckham. It was hoped ti...at 
J olmson C oulc assist in securing lUS defeat. 
Beckham had also enjoyed an active political life. He 
had, as a young politician, assumed the office of governor 
after the assassination of Governor William Goebel in 1900. 
Before assuming the governorts chair Beckham had been 
aligned with the nsilver" faction. It was during his 
administration that many of those who had opposed Bryan 
reasserted tne 1r influence in the party. After leaving the 
state capitol he broke his old assooiation with the 
dominant faction. 
It was during this period that Beckham formed his 
close friendship with Percy Haly of l-"'ranltfort. Haly I s 
career also dated back to the 1890' s. Although he had 
served only in minor positions, such as railroad com-
missioner, he had acquired a ~~eat deal of power within the 
Party. This power and influence he would use in 1935, and 
in so doing would be instrumental in defeating the opposing 
faction. 
For a number of years after leaving Frankfort, Beckham 
served as United States Senator. Defeated in the 1921 
election, he returneo to Kentuck1 and formed a law partner-
ship with Elwood Hamilton, an influential Louisville 
Lemocrat. 12 Urged 'by Haly, reformist groups, and others 
l2Intcrview with Clay ':lade BailcJ', June 6, 1966. 
Bailey was in 1935 Prankfort correspondent for the Courier-
Journal nne :'s nOl-l Ftrankfort corI'espondent for the Cincin-
ati Enquirer. Hereafter cited as Interview with baIley, lIt. 
opposed to the bi-partisan coalition, bec~dJ.alrt entered the 
1927 Lemocratie gubernatorial primary. 
12 
TIlis was not the first attempt by a candidate to 
defeat the coalition. Irl 192,3, a little KnOwn politician 
from \~estern Kentucky, Alben E\arkley, had unsuccessfully 
oppesed the Combine t s candidate for the t-eInocratic 
nomination. Unlike Barkley, Beckham was able to defeat the 
dominant taction's candidate in the Democratic primary and 
thus secured the gubernatorial nomination. The bi-partisan 
coalition then ral11ed behind the Republican candidate, 
Flem Sampson. Although Becldl8!1l presented the Combine with 
its most formidable challenge, he suffered deteat in the 
general election. nlUS, control of the government by the 
Combine seemed assured for another tour years. But few 
things are as uncertain as Kentucky politics and within two 
year>s the Republican ... D~mocratic alliance had been destroyed. 
In payment for assistance gi'len in the 1927 campaign, 
Governor Sampson retained Ben Johnson as chairman of the 
Highway Commission. Disagreements soon developed between 
Johnson and Sampson as both SOUGht to donunate the Higaway 
Commission. In February, 1929, Johnson resigned from the 
C01llr1.ission and began actively working to destroy the 
Sampson Administration. He was soon joined in his efforts 
by other Lemocratic members of the coalition, such as Billy 
Klair and Allie Young of Morehead, who had also clBshed 
with Sampson. The bi-partisan coalition found itself 
threatened even more when Democrats of the dissident wing 
13 
of the party joined the JOMson group .. 
The first clash between the S1ll11pson Administration e.nd 
the I'Gtnocrats occurred ir.. the 19.30 elec tlOllS. There 
follo'..Jed, in the 1931 88813 ion of the C€!leral AS8emhly, a 
st!'uggle between tile tllO O'oups avo!' the pas~·v.ge of H bill 
'¥Jnich placed the control of the highway department in the 
l'l.ands of tJ:l.e I.emocrats. Undor the provisions of thls bill, 
appointments and removals on the H1g11way Commission would 
be made bJ the lieiltenant governor and the attorney general 
sunject to the approval of the state Senato. Both the 
lieutenant governor and flttorney general were Iemocrats 
allied with Johnson and thus the measure was clearly 
designed to tal!.e from S&'lT'.pson his greatest source of money 
and power. The passage of' th1s so-called "P.iDper Billn by 
a f.ernocratic 1T'.ajor-ity in the state legislature meant the 
final destruction of bi-partlsan contr0l. 
The disharmony provoked in 1927 by the factional 
fi6ht1ng in the remocratio primary and the disruption of 
tne hi-partisan coali tion served to convin.ce Johnson and 
other Lemocratic leaders that the 19.31 gubern~torial 
nom1nation would have to be mace in tl:-;;a.nner .... ::hich bespoke 
ami ty and c encere. Eoplng to avoid the tyP(; of intra-party 
fighting '\olhich frequer!tl~ characterized m.any Lemocratic 
primar-ies, many partJ members advocated the use of a con-
ventiOl} to select th.e party' ~ no:ninee. These men als(I 
undoubtedly believed that through a convention tney could 
secure the nomination of candi{lates i'avoral,le to t.hem~elves 
and thus perpetuate their own power. Accordingly, they 
quietly began early in 1931 to gather support for the con-
vention method of nomination. 
However, this proposal did not receive the endorsement 
of all KentUCKY L,emocrats. before the Democratic Party 
made its final decision as to a convention or primary 
election two meetings of the party's Executive Committee 
were held. In addition, the constitutionality of the 
state's election laws were contested in the state's courts. 
Much of the opposition to the convention came from the 
powerful L'emocratic paper, The Courier-J ournal. Oppos i tion 
to the convention system was not strong enough in 1931 to 
prevent its adoption but in many ways it foreshadowed the 
type of controversy which developed in 1935. 
The Democratic convention of' 1931 selected as its 
gubernatorial nominee, Ruby Laffoon of Madisonville. 
Laffoon's nomination was secured primarily through the 
efforts of Ben Johnson and his son-in-law, Lan Talbot. l ) 
The gubernatorial nomination was made without much 
controversy, but a heated struggle developed when the 
delegates to the convention sought a running-mate for 
Laffoon. Johnson and Talbot supported Albert B. Chandler 
of Versailles, Kentucky, for the nomination. On the other 
hand, Laffoon and his followers, principally Thomas S. 
Rhea, opposed Chandler's nomination. Laffoon opposed 
Chandler publicly on the grounds that he was too young and 
13Baylor, Talbot, p. l1.~ 7. 
1$ 
inexperienced. Poss ibly a more impor·tant factor was that 
Chandlernad been associated with the minority faction of 
the party, while Laffoon was identified with the dominant 
faction. Nevertheless, the Johnson-Young-Talbot will pre-
vailed and Chandler received the nomination. liuring the 
campai~n differences between Laffoon and Chandler were 
submerged and a united ticket was presented to the voters. 
But the wounds inflicted in the selection of Chandler never 
healed. Instead they became the first blows in some of the 
most intense fighting in the party's hlstorJ'. 
The ballots of the 1931 election had hardly been tab-
ulated and Laffoon installed as governor before the 
ill-will generated in the nominating convention reappeared, 
paving the way for an even more hotly contested battle 
over nominating methods in 1935. The Lemocratic coalition, 
which had been formed during the Sampson Administration 
and which had skillfully managed the 1931 election, was not 
a manifestation of a reconoiliation of Kentucky l"emocrats. 
It had been created when both factions found that they 
faced a com~on foe. Once Victory had been achieved, the 
old animosities and Lmbitions reasserted themselves. The 
remocrats, who had united in their opposition to Sampson, 
were once again divided. 
The disharmony which plagued the Laffoon admi r;lstra-
tion 'Was first evidenced wben Laffoon called for the 
enactment of a three per cent sales tax. This measure, it 
was hopec, would help to alleviate some of the economic 
16 
problems created by the Great Jiepressior:. It was Laffoon's 
eonterltion tha.t the revenue received from the sales tax 
would provide the state with the necessary funds to par-
tioipate in federal relief programs. The governor first 
proposed such a measure during the 1932 session of the 
state legislature, but the anti-administration forces, led 
by Chand leI', Talbot and Allie Young, enc ountered little 
difficulty in defes.ting it. 
In 193), the Federal government notified Kentucky 
that before it could receive the benefits of the F'ederal 
Emergenoy Funds, the state would have to provide a required 
three million dollars. After conferring with Federal 
Relief rarectoI', Harry Hopkins, La.ffoon issued a call for s. 
special session of the General Assembly to meet on August 
15, 1933. This meeting of the legislature was to devise 
some means of meeting the demands made by vlashington. l1," 
vlhen Laffoon submitted his program to t1:1e legislature, it 
centered around what he called "an emergency gross reoeJ.pts 
tax.,,15 It was apparent to all that what Laffoon euphe-
m1stioally proposed was a sales tax. 1~e special session 
of the leGislature lasted for more tn.an a month, but 
adjourned without passage of the sales tax. Eackers of 
Laffoon could not muster enough votes in either the House 
l4LeXington Herald, August 11, 1933, p. 1. 
15Commonwealth of Kentucky, Journal of the Extraor-
dinary Session of the Kentucky Senate (Frankfort: The 
state Journal Company), August 15, 1933, :). 17. 
17 
or Senate for the measure. The governor did succeed in 
passing thr'ough the House a one per cent consumer tax, but 
this measure "'8S defeated in the Senate by the anti-
administration fOT'ces. 16 
I;urlng 1932 and 1933, Laffoon" ably assisted by Thomas 
f). Hhea, had been steadily increasing his legislative 
support. Al thour;~1 several cand idates supported by the 
r;:overnor had been successful at th.e polls, Laffoon did not 
directly seek enactment of the sales tax during the reg-
111ar 1934 session of the General Assembly. However, he 
took seversl indirect steps toward securing its passage at 
a later date. In a general reorganization of the state 
goverm;1ent, Laffoon removed all signifIcant author! ty from 
the office of lieutenant governor. This move was un-
doubtedly directed again~ t Chandler, w~o by that time was 
leading the anti-ad:n1nistration forces in the legislature. 
That Laffoon had captured control of the legislature 
'Nas furthE'r demonstrated 1n the resolution pAssed shortly 
before i ts adjourr~:nlent. The resolution !'equested the 
q:overnor to ca.ll an ext!'aordlnary session of the General 
Assembl:y to B ct on appropri at ions a.nd :('evenue measures .17 
Laffoon. responding to this request, 'f"€COllVened the legis-
lat.ure in ?1ay, and quickly sought the enactment of a. sales 
16~., September 26, 1933, p. 2'(0. 
17Commonwealth of Kentucky, Journal of the Kentucky 
Senate, RC~U1ar 19311 Session (Fr"lnkfort: The State Journal 
Company), V, March 14, 1934, p. 5451. 
18 
bill. l'his time he succeeded in his 8 ttempt. 
The sales tax measure did not get through this session. 
unopposed. Various other taxes were proposed as substi-
tutes for a general sales tax. Some members of trw legis-
lature advocated a tax on tobaoco, wine or beer. Others 
supported the taxing of cosmetics and soft drinks. A bill 
was introduced whioh would have taxed admissions to places 
of amusement and utilities. l8 But all these measures were 
rejected and the sales tax adopted. 
Passage of the measure proved extremely difficult. 
After having twice rejeoted the bill advocated by Laffoon, 
tlw House on June 8, 1934, passed the measure by a vote of 
fifty-one to forty_seven. l9 In the Senate the bill faced 
stiffer opposition. lespite the tactics of tite Chandler 
group, the Senate passed the sales tax bill one week later 
by a vote of twenty to seventeen. 20 An indioation of the 
relative strength of the two factions in the legislature 
is seen in the faot that the sales tax passed both houses 
with a one vote majority. 
It is not the purpose of this cisoussion to determine 
the reasons for Laffoon's advocaoy of the sales tax or to 
19House Journal, June 8, 1934, pp. 492-93. 
20Commonwea1th of Kentucky, Journal of the Extraor-
dinary Session of the Kentucki Senate (Frankfort: The 
State Journal Company), June 5, 1934, p. 287. 
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ascertain l>Jhether the measure "Jas necessary to meet the 
financial needs of the state. What is significant for a 
study dealing with the 1935 gubernatorial election, is the 
fact that the sales tax proved to be one of the most un-
popular forms of taxation in the state's his tory. l,Jhen 
the sales tax was enacted it appeared that Laffoon had 
achieved a major victory over his political enemies. 
While he had defeated the Chandler forces in the 1934 en-
coun ters, he had at the same time lIDkno'Wingly provided them 
with a campaigrl issue in the sales tax. 'filis issue would 
become a crucial element in the outcome of the 1935 
election. Laffoon, in signing the sales tax bill, had 
remarked: "In six months time this will be the most 
popular law ever enacted in Kentucky.,,21 Contrary to the 
governor's expectations the tax became extremely unpop-
ular, and A. B. Chandler, the man who had opposed it for 
three years, 'Would be pitted against the Laffoon supported 
candidate in the 1935 Lemocratic primary. Comm.enting on 
the passage of the sales tax, ~allace Embry, a prophet 
much 'Wiser than Laffoon, said: "It was a good fight over 
a trail of broken promises. The taxpayers will be waiting 
at the polls in the next election. It t 8 just pa.rtly 
over. n22 
Laffoon found opposition not only in the legislature, 
but also in the highway departrnent. After assuming the 
21courier-Journal, June 16, 1934, p. 1. 
22Baylor, Talbot, P. 2'11. 
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office of governor, Laffoon har: 1'e1ns tated Johnson as 
chairman of the Hie;hwBJ Commission. It will be recalled 
thai; it weB ,Johnson who had been :nost responsible for 
Laffoon t, nomination in 1931, and for !:1 few munths the tuo 
politicians appeared to work harmoniously together. 
Criticizing this relationship, one newspaper stat~d: 
"Omnipotence sits enthroned on Johns on t s de sk • • • .He is 
keeper of the state's Conscience, Chancellor of Hoad 
E.1Cohequer, Lord High Exeoutioner, office boy and rnail 
clerk. n23 
It was not long before differences between the two 
men began to Appear. Conflict seems to hav~ developed 
over the attempt of both to control the Highway Com-
mission. During Laffoon's administration, the Commiss ion 
was made up of eight members. As the differences devel-
oped, the eir;ht quickly ali::ned themselves with either 
Johnson or Laffoon. Laffoon was, for a short period, 
prevented from removing those opposed to him by the bill 
passed during the Sampson administration which placed the 
authority to remove and appoint members in the hands of 
the lieutenant governor and attorney general. Chandler, 
as lieutenant governor and a leader of the anti-
administration forces, refused to cooperate with Laffoon, 
who thus lacked the authority to remove those who aligned 
themselves with Johnson. One of the governor's primary 
objectives in the 1934 reorganization of the state 
23Lexington lIE raId, I'e cember 2, 1934. 
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government was the removal of this authori ty from 
Chandler. He achieved it in the "ouster law" which gave 
the governor the authority to dismiss, without explanation 
or hearing, any appoultee in the government. As soon as 
the constitutionality of the "ouster law" had been upheld 
by the state courts, Laffoon acted. From Lecember, 1934, 
to March, 1935, Johnson and his three supporters on the 
Commission, A. P. Plummer, Zach Justice and Charles 
Fernell, were all removed by Laffoon. 
After his dismissal, Johnson, assisted by Lan Talbot, 
joined forces with the anti-administration faction. TI1US, 
by 1935 this faction counted among its leaders, Lieu-
tenant Governor Chandler, Allie Young, Ben Johnson and Ian 
Talbot, all of whom are among the craftiest politicians 
ever produced in the stat.e. Eventually J. C. W. Beckham 
also would align himself with the anti-administration 
faction and thus make complete the coalition which would 
do battle \dth the Laffoon forces for oontrol of the state 
govern"'TIent. 
In the early part of the struggle the Laffoon forces 
seel~d to enjoy an overwhelming advantage. They possessed 
the resources, both human and mat6rial, of the state 
government, and the assistance of a powerful political 
organization which maintained close ties with oounty 
officials. The anti-administration forces, at that time, 
had little financial support and only the nucleus of a 
state-wide political machine or organization. Confronted 
b~J \-lhat appc arec to be insurmcuntsble disadvantages, the 
anti-8tiministratlon '-roup be:gF<n to gather the funds rlu:oed 
to Har,e ('3 toU.gh political ca,mraigI1. Anc they .,latched for 
sny ~rl"'or on thE' ps.rt of the acministrat:i.on l'yv:.ich 'Would 
r.:;rovi(le t.hE':m 'Ld th a chance to l~!"ove their O"1!: position. 
I.e.ffoen prov1d(~c them \llth such an opportunity When he 
dec idee to oppose a primary election. 
CHAPTER II 
PHlMARY OR CONVL}I;TION 
In the early months of 1935, both the anti-admlnis-
tration faction and those who aligned themselves with 
Governor Laffoon turned their attention to the task of 
securing the Democratic gubernatorial nomination. Both 
groups were vitally interested in the method of nomination 
the party would use to select its nominees. Governor 
Laffoon and his supporters endorsed the calling of a 
nominating convention, convinced that they could thus 
oontrol the seleotion of candidates. l Those who endorsed 
a convention pointed to the taot that a convention had 
been held in 1931 to select the party's candidate and its 
ohoice had enjoyed overwhelming success in the general 
election. Implicit in their argument was the idea that 
the convention had been a major cause of the party's 
Victory. 
The anti-administration forces realized that there 
would be 11ttle hope of obtaining the nomination for a 
member of thelr faction ln a convention oontrolled by the 
Laffoon administration. Thus, Chandler and others advo-
cated nOminating the party's candidates in a direct 
lInterview with Clay ~ade Bal1ey, February 21, 1966. 
ilereafter cited as Interview with BB11e~ I. 
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primsr~. This group also had a powerful argument in the 
fact that the Iemocratic Party had traditionally used the 
direct primary to nominate its candidates. A brief look 
at the history of the primary in Kentucky will serve to 
explain their arguments and much of the controversy which 
arose in January, 1935. 
The direct primary in Kentucky has had a record of 
gradual legal transformation. The first legislation (;eal-
ing with primaries was enacted in 1880.2 This early act 
was limited in its provisions, permitting only the most 
populated counties to nominate candidates for local 
offices in primaries. 3 Following the example of many 
other states, Kentucky enacted a law in 1892 whicll made 
the primary applic~ble to the nomination of candidates for 
state offices. Under the provisions of this act primaries 
were not made compulsory but instead became optional. The 
authority to call a primary was vested in the "governing 
authority of the political parties." Although Kentucky 
did not lead in the direct primary moveme~t, it did 
pioneer in the movement for the enrollment of party 
voters. ttThe law of 1892 provided that at the regular 
registration voters might make a declaration of party 
allegiance. It also made provision for the use of the 
2Charles Edward Merriam and Louise Overacker, Primary 
Elections (Chicago: The Universit~ of Chicago Press, 
1928), p. 17. 
3~. 
2$ 
registration lists by the political parties at the primary 
e lee tions • n4 
I)uring the next twenty years conventions and prima-
ries were used by both political parties to choose their 
candidates. But with the passage of time, Lemoerats came 
to look with increasing favor upon the direct primary. 
Then ttafter the notorious convention of 1899 in which 
William Goebel was nominated in a long drawn out and 
internecine fiu;ht, • • • which ended eventually in the 
assassination of Goebel, the convention system became un-
popular with the Democratic party."S 
As the direct primary gained in popularit~, it became 
increasingly apparent that the provisions of the anti-
quated laws would have to be revised. The 1892 law had 
not specified a day for the holding of primaries. It 
required only that if a primary was called that it be held 
at least forty days before the general election, anc that 
public notice be £:;i ven of the primary. As a resul t of the 
inadequacies of the old law the political parties often 
held their primaries on different days, and frequently 
with only a minimum of public attention being drawn to the 
fact that a primary was scheduled. These" snap primaries, ft 
caused confusion and rese~tment among voters. 
The most important rea80n for the increased popularity 
,+ ~., fl. 31. 
5Sharmon and others, Political Behavior in Kentucky, 
p. 9. 
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of the direct primary was the odious image which the con-
vention system gradually acquired. The contentiouB manner 
in w;-;,ich conventions were often conducted and the scandal-
ous stories of corruption and political bargaining which 
circulated after each convention convinced many people 
that the system would have to be discarced. In addition 
to this criticism, there was growing during this period an 
ever mounting belief that the "people" should have the 
determining voice in the nomination of their candidates. 
Consequently, the direct primary came to be viewed as a 
more democratic method of nomination. 
As a result of tl~se factors, Kentucky, like many 
other states during the ProJ~ressive Era, enacted a new law 
in 1912 which made primary elections mandatory for the 
nomination of all candidates for state offices. This new 
act also corrected the worst abuses of the earlier legis-
lation by assigninr, one day, the first Saturday in August 
6 
of each year, for the holding of primary elections. 
Furthermore, under the provisions of the new law there 
would be no conventions, and it would not be possible for 
"snap primaries" to occur; both political parties wou2.d 
select their candidates on the same day throu+;hout the 
state. 
I/espite the general acelaim which the 1912 law 
received, in less then a decade the direct primary had 
6John I. Carroll (ed.), The Kentuoky Laws. Statutes 
(Louisville: The Baldwin Law Book Company, 1918), III, 
312. 
once a.r~aln come under c!'iticnl f'ttt!l.ck in Kentucky and 
across the nation. !\lthough repeal of the dlrect primary 
was given serious consideration in many states, only in a 
7 few was such a measure actually enacted. One of these 
states was !~entuck;Y, which in 1920 repealed the mandatory 
provision of the primary law, but only as it applied to 
nominations for state offices. Candidates for county, 
municipal or national offices still ~lad to be chosen in a 
primary. Under the provisions of the 1920 law political 
parties were given the option of choosing their candidate 
for state offices either in a primB.ry or s convention. 
The authority to choose the method of nomination was given 
8 to the governing authority of the parties. 
A significant :factor in the repeal of the primary law 
was that the action was taken under a Republican adminis-
tration and Republicans in Kentucky had traditionally 
supported the convention system. This s\~port existed for 
many reasons, all of which derived basically from the fae t 
that Republicans were in a minority in the state. Because 
of this, the RepublIcan Party lacked the financial re-
sources that the Democratic Party possessed, and primaries 
are, in most instances, more expensive than conventions. 
Furthermore, because its onl~ hope for success at the 
polls lay in united opposition or in an alignment such as 
7!1el"'r1o.:.n and Overacker, Primary r.:lectiqnfl, D. 106. 
8'~Tilliam FdwA.l"d Bald'uin (ed.), Carroll';<3 ICuntnck 
Statutes (Louisville: The Standard Printing Co., >, 
p. fl3l. 
had existed under the bi-partisan rule, the Republicans 
rarely had more than one strong candidate for any single 
office. Fewer in number and lacking equal financial 
resources, the Republicans would only destroy their own 
party if they indulged in the type of intra-party 
struggles which characterized many of the Lemocratic 
primaries. 
The provisions of the 1920 law worked very well for 
both parties for eleven years. The Republicans, in most 
cases, chose their candidates in conventions, while Lemo-
crats picked theirs in primaries. Then, in 1931, the 
r;emocrats, for the first time since 1899, nomina ted their 
canaidates in a convention. Ifhe contl'oversy which had 
been generated in 1931 and the division which developed 
within the Laffoon administration served as preliminaries 
for tile struggle waged on behalf of the primary in 1935. 
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The question of how the party would nominate its 
gubernatorial cand~ate in 1935 was first raised b~ anti-
administration leaders when they sought to pass a com-
pulsory pri.ma.r:i act during the 1934 session of the Gene',~al 
Assembly. These efforts were blocked by the administra-
tion. 
As the time approached for the party to choose its 
candidates and as the number of politicians who openly 
sought the nomination increased, widespread speculation 
was generated as to the course of action the temocratic 
Executive Committee would take. As the interest increased, 
so did public endol~sement of' the direct roriman'. 'llhls 
sentiment woule :~ave remained a latEcnt force except for 
the work of a very skillful and shrev/d journalist. 9 
r-1ore than any other person, Howard i~. Henderson, 
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!t'rankfort correspondent for the Courler-,;ourna,l, was res-
ponsible for orGanizing and giving expression to public 
opposition to the convention system. lO An experienced 
observer of Kentucky politics, Henderson combined a keen 
intelliGence with a zealous devotion to honest and effi-
cient goverrunent. Few politicians or administrations 
escaped his crusading scrutiny. fie "exposed numerous 
scandals during his term at Frankfort and incurred the 
bitter enmity of' politicians who were his victims."ll 
ItRuthless lt in many ways, he was undaunted by the attacks 
of his enemies. And he possessed, in the circulation of 
the Courler-Journal, an influential and powerful means of 
communicating his findines to the public. 
In the latter part of 19~~, Henderson began to urge 
the calling of a primary in his column, "From the State 
Capitol. 1I His efforts were suppor-ted by the Couriar-
Journal and its publisher, Robert ~orth Bingl~m. In 1935 
Bingham was serving as Ambassacor to Great Britain, but 
he had been aligned with the anti-administration wing of 
9Interview with Bailey, III. 
IOllli· 
llY·1ark Ethridge to Olivia Frederick, April 15, 1966, 
in tae possession of thE author. 
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the party for a number of years and had actively worked to 
improve its position in the state. Bingham was closely 
associated with J. C. W. Beckham and Percy Haley, both of 
whom were identified with the dissident faction of the 
Lemocratic Party. 
The newspaper, backed by Bingham and the determined 
assistance of Henderson, embarked upon an intensive cam-
paign designed to arouse public opinion in support of the 
primary to such proportions that it could be ignored only 
by those who courted defeat at the polls. Early in 1935, 
Henderson began canvassing counties throughout the state, 
asking officials and voters their preference as to a 
primary or convention. According to Henderson, the 
responses to these questions indicated overwhelming sup-
12 port for the primary. 
This canvass of public opinion preceded the state-
wide poll taken by the paper early in 1935. On January 
16, the Courier-Journal announced that it had mailed 
250,000 ballots to remocrats and Republicans throughout 
the state. On these they were to indicate their prefer-
ence for a primary or convention. These ballots, the 
paper stated, had been sent to a cross-section of men and 
women of different occupations and professions. The 
number of ballots used in the poll represented a fairly 
large sample of Kentuoky voters. In the 1931 guber-
natorial election, approximately 820,000 votes had been 
12CouriiJr-Journal, Janll.ary 19, 1935, p. 1. 
cast and a year later about 975,000 KentuckirulS voted in 
the Presidential election. The C01..1I'ier-J ournal ballots 
thus represented more than one voter for every four who 
werlt to the polls in 1932.13 
When the returned ballots were counted, they in-
dicated that the majority of the people in the state 
favored a primary. The poll received the attention of 
newspapers across the entire state. One of the reasons 
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that the poll attracted so much interest was that on the 
day after it was announced, a meeting of the Lemocratic 
Executive Committee was unexpectedly called and scheduled 
to meet before the deadline date for return of the ballots. 
When the call was issued for the Executive Committee 
meeting the Courier-Journal requested those who had 
received ballots to return them as quiCkly as possible, so 
that the count could be made before the committee 
convened.14 Obviously, the newspaper hoped that if the 
returns were favorable to the primary, it would convince 
the Cotmn.ittee to oall a primary. 
On January 27, the day before the oommittee met, the 
paper reported that participants in the poll preferred 
the primary by a vote of 60,207 to 5,558 - a ratio of 
eleven to one.15 The final tabulation of ballots in the 
poll was published on February 5. Of the 250,000 ballots 
13~., January 16, 1935, p. 1. 
14lE!£., Januar~ 17, 1935, p. 1. 
l5l£!£., January 27, 1935, p. 3. 
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mailed, 71,583 were returned. Of these, 65,571, or 91.6~;, 
indicated a preference for the primary. Lemocrats 
returned 47,9ltl ballots endorsing the primary as oompared 
with 3,710 who favored a convention. Hepublioans in the 
state registered a vote of 17,640 for the primary and only 
2,293 for th.e convention system.16 
Although the Executive Committee disregarded the 
Courier-Journal poll and other evidences of public support 
for a primal'S, the poll did affect later events. It 
demonstrated to Lieutenant Governor Chandler that wide-
spread support for 8. primary existed, and this was a 
faotor in his decision to call a speoial session of the 
legislature for the purpose of enactin~ a oompulsory 
primary law. 17 
It seems likely that the increasing interest evinced 
in a primary also influenced the actions of the admlnis-
tration. As the sentiment for a primary election 
increased, a meeting of the Democratic Exeoutive Committee 
was called by the oommi ttee chairman, Bailey v:ootton, to 
determine by what method the party would select its 
18 
candidates. The meeting was scheduled for January 28, 
a date earlier than the C ommlttee customarily met and 
prior to the time that the results of the poll would be 
161l?!2.., February 5, 1935, p. 1. 
17Interview with Albert b. Chandler, LeXington, 
Kentucky, I,ecember 6, 1965. Hereafter cited as Interview 
with Chandler. 
l8LeXington Herald, January 19, 1935, p. 1. 
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conclusive. In liGht of the a.ction that the committee 
took, it seems likclJi tha t the administration hoped to act 
before a gre.fl. t deal of P\1::; lie it;y ccou.ld te :;:Len to the 
results of the poll. It !ias apparent that the efforts of 
the Courier-Journal to secure a pr'imary ~as arousing wide-
spread interest. 
As the daJ neared for the meeting of the Executive 
Committee, the movement for a primery r~rew in strength. 
SensinG public support for the primru:'y, James Richmond and 
Frederick \!allis, both announced aspirants for the remo-
cratic gubernatorial nomination, publicly endorsed the 
direct ~)rimary. .r. majority of Kent'.;.cky's con~ressional 
delegation urged their party's chief executive body to 
order a primary. Alben Barkley, United states Senator 
from Kentucky, in a letter to a committee member, endorsed 
the primary by declaring: 
Regardless of the wishes 01' the interests 
of any candidate for any office, the 
right of the people to control their 
government, to p8~tlcipat6 in it, to 
demand faithful servi~e of it, and to see 
that it 1s administered for their welfare, 
is a fundamental r 19ht to vJhioh all 
selfish ambitions ~ust yield. 20 
In an attempt to impress the Executive Commdttee ~lth the 
importance of its decision, Berkley warned its members, 
ttyou may hold the destIny of the party in your own 
hand s • tt 21 
20rhe Louisville Herald Post, January 15, 1935, p. 1. 
2lcourier-Journal, January 24, 1935, p. 1. 
In addition to the exhortations of prominent polit-
ical figures, many of the newspapers in the state were 
also urging the cormnittee to call a primary. 'fhis was 
partioularly true of the Demooratic press. Commenting on 
this issue, the Interior Standard said in late January: 
If the cesires of the candidates • • •• 
are not of influence on the oommittee, 
then the almost solid demand of the 
Kentucky Democratic press • • • ought to 
cause the committee to order the primary 
method of making these nominations. 22 
The Federal administration and the national party 
also manifested an interest in the decision of the com-
mittee. Kentucky was the only state holding a major 
election in 1935. For this reason both of the national 
parties Bought to use a win in the state as a herald of 
victory in the 1936 Presidential election. On the day 
before the oommittee met Postmaster General James A. 
Farley, National Chairman of the Democratic Party, 
requested that the committee respeot the wishes of the 
voters by calling for a primary. 
The interest of the national party was also demon-
strated in the unexpected trip of Senator Barkley from 
Washington to Frankfort to address the oommittee. 
"Politicians quickly saw behind Senator Barkley's hurried 
trip to Frankfort the hand of the President himself," for 
it was widely known in politioal circles that the 
"President and other leaders of the national administration 
22!a! Stanford Interior standard, January 25, 1935, 
p. 1. 
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had sought reports on the Kentucky political situation. 1t23 
Senator Barkley began his address to the Executive 
Commi ttee by reading a letter from the President. In the 
presidential communication, President Roosevelt Expressed 
'tthe hope that in your state, without regard to political 
parties, the greatest freedom and widest opportunity may 
be accorded to all the people for participation in the 
selection of candidates as well as to their final 
selection.n24 The President optimistically concluded the 
letter by saying: 
May I indulge the hope and belief that 
in your state, and in all states, those 
who are charged with party responsibility 
will preserve and guarantee these indis-
putablecrlghts to the people of every 
c18ss.2 ;7 
After he had delivered Roosevelt's message, Barkley 
personally urged the committee to adopt the direct 
primary. "It is rather tragic,1I Barkley stated, "for 8 
Democrat to appeal before a I;emocratic committee and ask: 
it to be democratic."26 
When Senator Barkley concluded his speech, the com-
mittee heard an hour and a half address by Governor 
Laffoon. The governor defended his support of a CODven-
tion by asserting that "there are times when it is best to 
23The Herald Post, January 28, 1935, p. 3. 
21+Courier-Journal, January 29, 1935, p. 3. 
25~. 
26Lexington Herald, January 29, 1935, p. 1. 
nominate in a primary and there are times when those 
nominees should be chosen in a convention.,,27 Laffoon 
36 
implied that 1935 was one of those times when 8 convention 
should be used but refused to explain why it was so. The 
governor did say that he favored a oonvention "beoause I 
want to see Kr. Roosevelt renominated in 1936. 1128 He 
later refused to clarify this statement. Almost one half 
of Governor Laffoon's message was devoted to a denuncia-
tion of the Courier-Journal. He further implied that a 
convention would prevent this newspaper from obtaining 
oontrol of the state government. 
Following Governor Laffoon's speech the members of 
the committee were urged by two of the gubernatorial 
aspirants to respond to the desires of the people and 
adopt a primary. After hearing these two pleas, the 
commi ttee voted. 
In 1935, the Democratio Executive Committee was 
composed of twenty-five men and twenty-five women. Two 
men and two women were chosen from eaoh of the eleven 
congressional districts Which had existed prior to 1930. 
In addition, six members were chosen from the state-at-
large. 29 It is significant to note that "the governor, 
in effect, controlled the Executive Committee through the 
27~. 
28Courier-Journal, January 29, 1935, p. 1. 
291£.!2... 
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use of patronage. u30 
In less ttUl.n three hours from the time the committee 
had begun its meeting, the ballots had been cast and the 
results announced. The committee returned a vote of 
thirty to twenty in favor of a convention. Of the eleven 
congressional d 1s trlcts, IS 1x voted for a convention, three 
for a primary and two we!'e evenly divided .31 'I'ba com-
mittee also decided tl~t the nominating convention would 
meet at Lexington on !1ay 14. This state-wide convention 
was to be preceded by county conventions where delegates 
to the state convention would be chosen. The county con-
ventions were to be held on May 11. 
A question that must be raised and answered is why 
the Executive Committee took action which opposed over-
whelming public support for a primary. In so doing the 
committee members appeared to reject a basic principle of 
democratic government. By their actions they were saying 
that public officials did not have the duty to remain 
responsive to the desires of a majority of the qualified 
electors. For the privilege of nominating by convention, 
those in control of the committee willingly subjected 
themselves to a great deal of critioism. The reward, 
then, must have been considerable. It was, in faot, 
control of the state government for the next four years, 
for it was generally recognized that the Lemoc~ats would 
30Interview with Chandler. 
3lCourier-Journal, February S, 1935, p. 2. 
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win the next election. The selection of ternocratic 
candidates assumed for both factions a great impo:>tance. 
tlhile an~ candidate supported by the administration would 
enjoy an advantage in a primary, the Laffoon forces liars 
confident of controlling a convention. 'rhus, they \\lould 
be in a much safer position if the choice WIS made by a 
convention. 
The administration was assured of controlling a con-
vention because of the intrinsic nature of the system. 
'theoretically, delegates to state conventions were chosen 
by party members at the county level. In practice, little 
interest was demonstrated in most county conventions 
except by those who had a vested interest, principally 
those who owec their livelihood to the state administra-
tion. In most cases, the selection of delegates was left 
to a select few who were easily guided by the administra-
tion. 32 Thus, it is easy to see why the Laffoon forces 
placed their reliance on nomination by convention. 
Reaction to the committee's decision was immediate. 
Newspapers from all regions of the state responded in an 
indignant l1'1ftnner. "The action of the committee," the 
Times Star of Covington, declared, "leaves condltions in 
the I;emocratic Party in Kentucky in a 'sorry mess, t and 
amounted to saying to the 'rank and file t of IJemocrats be 
damned. It 33 Expressing sentiments similar to those of the 
32Interview with Chandler. 
33The Covln[:ton 'rime s-Star, January 29, 193.5, p. 1. 
!J.'imes-S ta.!', the Paduoah Sun Democrat c'!eclg,red: 
The committee hasn't l€ft itself a leg 
to stand on. The majority of its 
membe~s by their action have admitted, 
almost blatantly, that they are nothing 
but puppets to a machine wLlch counts 
its obligations to the national party 
as little as it does those to rea~ 
Lemocrats within the state •••• 34 
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Once the committee had made its decision, some news-
papers l,.,r1:1ich hac earlier endorsed the pr'imary, took a 
conciliatory attitude, urging harmony and unity. The 
Interior Standard, exemplifying this declared: 
The committee has spoken. While in 
our opinion, it did not represent 
e1 ther press, peoplf: or national or 
state leaders, other than the 
Governor, it is now the duty of all 
good Ilemccrsts to turn out in l1"J8.SS 
conventions and elect the best men 
possible to select as delegates to 
the Lexington conventlon.35 
There were also papers which approved the action of 
the committee. However's most of th.ese approached the 
dec 1s ion in an apologetic manner. For ip..13 tance, the 
Richmond raily Resister argued that "the committee made a 
deoision whioh it consIdered to be fot' tl1e best interests 
of t~le p art3. "36 
Many Republicans saw in the action of the Lemoorati.c 
Executive Committee an opportunity to improve their OWll 
34Paducah Sun Lemocrat, January 29, 193.5, clipping in 
Thomas Underwood Collection, Archives Livision, Margaret 
King Library, tTnlversity of Kentucky. 
35rnterior Standard, February 1, 1935, p. 2. 
36R1ehmond r'sily Resistet:, Januttt'J- 29, 1935, p. 3. 
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election chances. "The horizon breaks brightly for the 
Republican Party in 1935, a brightness not seen for many 
years," the Harlan Daily Enterprise optimistically stated. 
The paper further urged Republicans in Kentucky to nomi-
nate their candidates by primary, and by so dr!1:;g secure 
"the mass of votes alienated by the Democratic Executive 
Committee's aotions.,,37 
It is extremely difficult to ascertain now the re-
action of the general public to the decision of the 
committee. Many persons attempted to create the impres-
sion that voters were indignant over events. It is doubt-
ful that the public was quite as aroused as the proponents 
of a primary contended. However, it is clearly evident 
that the direct primary had a great deal of popular sup· 
port among Kentuckians. !'lany civic, business and labor 
organizations had publioly supported the calling of a 
primary. Citizens from many counties in the state hf:d 
met in local groups and passed resolutions endorsing the 
direct primary.38 
The controversy over the method of nomination to be 
used was given ample coverage by all the major papers in 
the state. Few newspapers were neutral, for they could 
not afford to be on an issue that aroused such popular 
interest. Strongly worded editorials were published 
37Harlan Daily Enterprise, January 29, 1935, p. 2. 
38goyrter-Journal, Jar!uary 6, 1935, p. 1. 
1~1 
supporting both the primary and convention. But those 
endorsing the primary were by far the more n~rous. 
Many papers conducted polls in their local areas in an 
attempt to determine public sentiment. 39 These polls 
demonstrated the popularity with which the primary ~as 
viewed. 
Both factions were aware that the method of nomina-
tioD chosen would be of vital importance to their future. 
l"or the administration, B. primar:; meant possible <"efeat; 
for the anti-administration forces, it was the only chance 
for success. For a short time after the executive Com-
mittee meeting, it seemed that the administration had 
achieved victory. But the ambitions of the anti-adminis-
tration faction would be promoted by public opinion. 
Public antipathy towards a convention and genuine support 
for the primary had been manifested in the actions of 
prIvate and political organizations, and in the writings 
of journalists throughout the state. Cognizant of this 
support and presented with an opportunity, the anti-
administration faction secured a cirect primary. 
II 
On F'ebruary 5, 1935, Governor Laffoon and Thomas S. 
Rhea, the administration's choice for the Lemocratic 
gubernatorial nomination, left Frankfort on a journey to 
39Ibid ., January 15, 1935, p. 2, e.g. Courier-
Journal:--
\vashington, 1,. C. The announced purpose of the trip was 
t,.loe acquisition of Federal funds for construction of 
Kentucky roads and the discussion of a prison-labor prob-
lem which was confronting the state. But it was widely 
known that a more important reason for the trip was the 
concern of Governor Laffoon over his administration's 
relations with the national administration.40 The com-
It2 
mittsets decision to nominate by convention was considered 
by many a direct affrollt to the Roosevelt administration 
and the national party. But there had also been earlier 
difficulties between the two administrations. During the 
1934 session of the General Assembly, which, it will be 
recalled, was controlled by the administration, a measure 
to provide for state enforcement of lrRA codes had been 
defeated. In addition, the legislature had refused to 
ratify the Child Labor Amendment. 41 Both measures were a 
part of the New Leal program. There had also been prob-
lems connected wi th Kentucky matching the funds of the 
141ederal relief measures. Lifferences had thus accumulated 
for a couple of years. Dissension in an election year 
would be intolerable for the Laffoon forces, for they 
needed the support of the Roosevelt administration. 
But the governor faced one major problem in leaving 
Kentucky. It meant that Chandler, as lieutenant ;;overnor, 
40Interview with Bailey, I. 
resentatives 1-
h3 
would head the: state gover'nment. Althourr,h the trip would 
take only t-VlO days, it was feared that Chandler, as acting 
governor, woule: take some action vJhich would be damaging 
to the plans of the administration. hvery conceivable 
course of action open to Chandler was discussed by 
Laffoon's forces. 42 The possibility that he might call a 
special session of the legislature was considered, but 
Laffoon was of the opinion that Chandler would not take 
such a step.43 Not all of Laffoon's advisors ag~reed with 
his judgement. "Leslie ~/orris, president of the F'armers 
State Bank, while riding on the train with Laffoon and 
Rhea from Frankfort to Lexington, warned them that 
Chandler would probably call a special session and that it 
would be wisest not to leave the state. IIJ+4 However, 
Laffoon remained confident that Chandler would not do 
that. 4S 
And Chandler might not have called for the special 
session except for the exhortations of Howard Henderson. 
Before leaving ~'rankfort, Laffoon and his cohorts had 
agreed that Chandler would not be informed of the depar-
ture until the train had orossed the state line. However, 
Henderson was informed that the Governor was leaving. To 
42Interview with 1:.1am Huddlestoll, Louisville, 
Kentucky, June 18, 1966. Huddleston was State Treasurer 





check on this information, he sent Clay \oJede Bailey, ti'len a 
correspondent for the Courier-Journal, to the railway 
station to see if the governor and Rhea boarded th,e train 
for vlashington.!../-6 vJheb Bailey arrived at the station, the 
train had already departed.l.J.7 
Henderson, believing his information to be correct, 
phoned Gerald Griffin, the Courier-Journal's Lexington 
reporter, and asked him to check the train at Lexington to 
see if the governor was on it. After Griffin confirmed 
Laffoon's presence on the train, Henderson telephoned 
Chandler at his home in Versailles, and told him of the 
governor's trip.48 At the same time, Henderson also sug-
gested to Chandler that he call a special session of the 
legislature to enact a compulsory primary law. The 
lieutenant governor, accepting the advice of Lan 'Talbot 
and others who were at his home, at first resisted the 
idea of calling a special sesslon.49 But Hunderson 
phoned Chandler several more times during the night in an 
effort to persuade him. He pointed out to Chandler that 
such a step would be extremely popular with voters and 
that only through a primary could any of his associates be 
46Interview with Clay \-lade bailey, J'une 1, 1966. 
Hereafter cited as Interview with Bailey, II. 
47~. 
IJ.8Interview with Allan N. Tront, Frankfort, Kentuc ky, 
l'iay 5, 1966. In 1935 Trout was correspondent fOIl Courier-
Journal. Hereafter cited as Interview with Trout. 
49Interview with Bailey, II. 
nominated. Thase efforts continued until after 1+:00 a.m., 
~-J . • en Henderson persuaded Zacl'l Justice, an influentis.l 
Pikeville Lemocrnt, to oall Chandler a.nd talk lllith. him. SO 
Af'ter a ;;reat dea.l of discussion, Cha..· .. )(Her acceded to the 
idea. 
E:lrly the next morning the acting r;overnor went to 
the capitol where he called Henderson. "The reporter tilen 
jOined Chandler and t ogether t·:).e~ planned their action. 
'l'hey obtained 13. copy of a recent Court of Appeals decision 
which had upheld a call for a special session and used the 
same phraseology that had been used in that case. uSl 
In the proclamation calling for the special session, 
Chandler explain'9d his actions by saying: 
The people of the Com'-'l1onwealth of' Kentucky 
~~ve indicated in no uncertain terms their 
desire to have an opportunity to s elect the 
nominees for State offices in state-wide 
primaries, and ••• the ri.~:ht of the people 
to have primaries is a fundamental one and 
ought not to be denied.52 
Iespite Chandler's assertion that he was merely obeying 
tithe will of the people J" the reaction to the proclamation 
wa~ not one of universal approval. Public reaction for 
the most part followed partisan lines. Some denounced 
Chandler's actions as danrerous and being politically 
motivated. "It no',; develops ,n declared the Herald Post. of' 
Louisville, "that a certain group joined in the cry for a 
50Interview with Trout. 
5lI2!£._ 
52Courier-Journal, Februar~ 7, 1935, p_ 2. 
primary, not for the welfare of the state, but for the 
purpose of grabbing control of the l!emocratic party.n.53 
Even more provoked by Chandler's actions, the Lexington 
Herald charged: 
r It means a chance for f1Uappylt lreferrlng 
to the Lieutenant Governor t s nickname] to 
stand on his head before the grandstand 
•••• Kentucky has had many clown acts in 
her volcanic and grilling history, but for 
downright bumptiousness, the call of Happy 
(beg pardon, Governor Albert Benjamin 
Chandl~r) for a special session wins the 
prize.!:>4 
46 
Ignoring the question of motive, many individuals re-
garded the action of the acting governor as heroic and 
worthy of praise. "The thoughtful and patriotic act of 
Lieutenant Governor Chandler," said the Kentucky Standard, 
"has met with unanimous approval except with a few aspir-
ing politicians and a bunch of jobholders under the 
'thumbnail' of Governor Laffoon."5.5 
More important than public reaction, was the response 
of the administration. Governor Laffoon was in an ante-
chamber of the United states Senate when Senator Barkley 
brought him word of what had occurred. He and Tom Rhea 
immediately made arrangements to return to Frankfort. 
Most people, including the Chandler forces, eXpected 
the governor to try to revoke the proclamation calling for 
53Herald Post, February 7, 1935, p. 8 • 
.54Lexlngton Herald, February 7, 193.5, p. 3 • 
.5.5~ Bardstown Kentucky Standard, February 21, 1935, 
p. 2. 
the special sess ion of thE Gcne:,"al Assembly. 'the contro-
'!ersy over whether he possessed the authori t~ to do so 
added to the alread y conf'us ing political scene. Th.e 
Constitution of Kentucky, while it confers the authority 
to call sessions of the General Assembly on both the 
governor and acting governor, provides no revoking pro-
cedure. Contending that he had the right to exercise this 
authority, Laffoon, upon returning to Kentuc~y issued a 
revocation proclamation. In it he stated: 
The Constitution provides that the 
Governor may upon extraordinary 
occasions convene the General 
Assembly • • •• There is no extraor-
C!inary occasion at this time neces-
si tating the convening of the Gener'a! 
Assembly, and there is no urgent 
public necessity now existing demand-
ing the attention of the law makin€ 
body for the welfare of t~L1e state • .,...,6 
'l'he governor further justified his actions by arguing that 
a special session would prcbably have to be called in the 
summer to €;;nable Kentucky to participate in FedEral pro-
r~ams, and the expense of two special sessions would be 
too great a burden upon the taxpayers of the state. 
In an attempt to prevent the governor from revoking 
Chandler's proclamation, the arlti-administration leaders 
secured a restraining order. The controversy became very 
heated over the question of whether the restraining order 
or the revocation order had been issued first. Laffoon's 
train had been met at Huntington, West Virginia by the 
,56Courier'-Journal, Februar~ 8, 1935, p. 2. 
governor' f.~ secretar;y, who brought wi th him the revocation 
order. The governor signed it soon after the train 
crossed the Kentucky-vlest Virginia t;:order near Ashland .. 
This was at about i.t.:10 a.m., which was clearly prior to 
the time the restraining order was granted. Governor 
Laffoon maintained that the order was official the minute 
he signed it. On the other hand, the Chandler forces 
argued that the revocation order was not official until it 
had been entel'cd on the exeoutive journal by the Secretary 
of state.. This had not been 00ne at the time the re-
straining order was issued .. 
v-lhile the legalitJ of the revocation order was being 
brought before the s ta te courts, Chandler met wi til thirty-
five representatives and twelve senators on February 8, in 
the first meeting of the special session. Lacldng a "''Drk-
ing quorlli~, the body adjourned until the following day. 
The decision as to whether the gov61'nor possessed the 
power to revoke the order of the acting governor, was 
first brought before the Franklin Cirouit Court. The 
administration's argument oentered on an old Nebraska 
Court of Appeals deoision, the only known legal preoedent. 
fttfhat Court had held that the governor was within his 
rights in revoking a oall for a special session made in 
absenoe by an acting governor. nS7 
On February 11, 1935, the Franklin Circuit Court 
handed down its deoision. The presiding judge, H. Church 
S7~., Februar:; 10, 1935, p. 1. 
Ford, ruled that: 
The executive has no implied power, 
after onoe exeroising the disoretion 
given to call the General Assembly 
into session to revoke that oall. 
The proclamation b~ the Governor is 
the final aot, insofar, as the 
Governor is oonoerned • • •• An1 
other interpretation would give to a 
proolamation of this charaoter such 
unoertainty and instabillty that 
intolerable confusion and uncertainty 
would prevail.58 
In oom.,'nenting on the Nebraska case, the judge said that 
the decision "was rendered by a divided court," and the 
dissenting opinion seemed to be "supported by the better 
authority and botter reasoning."59 
Judge Ford's deoision made no mention of the restrain-
ing order and its alleged violation. Nor did it say 
whether the exeouti ve order was official until entered on 
the exeoutive journal. It merely held that the governor's 
power W8.S exhausted when he issued the call and that he 
lacked the power to revoke it. 
The following day, February 12, the Kentuoky Court of 
Appeals, in a four to three deoision, affirmed the Circuit 
Court's deoision. Meanwhile, the administration, sensing 
its defeat in the state courts, turned its attention to 
tl:1E.1 special If.-gislative session. '!'here the Laffoon foroes 
direoted t'leir efforts towa.rds preventing the passage of a 
primary hill. Hopef'ully, this could be accomplished by 
58Ho~ster v. Brook; Laf.foon v, Ranklin, 258 Ky. 152, 




deadlocking the session. However, if thc;y were unable to 
do that tiley could still seek passage of a prima.ry bill 
favorable to their plans. 
On February 11./., a bill was introduced in the Senate, 
providing for t!W selection of candidates in ODC primary.60 
On the sa-:ne Gay the administration introduced a bill which 
prOirided for run-off pri!na!'ioa \-1hich were common through-
out the South. 6l The provisions of the run-ofr bill 
provided that if one candidate did not receive a majority 
in the primary 1 the hiD oandidates receiving the largest 
n~~bar of votes wotud then engage in a run-off election. 
On the other hand, the single prirmry bill required only 
that a candidate reeeive a plurality to receive the 
nomination. No second primaries would be held. 
~ie administration's support of the run-orf primary 
was based on the belief that through such a system the 
nomination of an anti-administration candidate could be 
prevented. In February, 1935, it seemed likely that J. C. 
W. Beckham would be the candidate backed b~ the anti-
administration forces, and the acministration mapped its 
course to maet his candidacy. In an address to the 
special session, Laffoon made reference to Beckham's 
probably candidacy when he said that he "supposed the 
Courier-Jou.,,'''nal would go and .~et the same old horse out of' 
60COl'llrr'.onwealth of KentuCI{y, Journal of Extraordinarf 
Session of the Senate (Frankfort: State Journal Company , 
p. J+7. 
611l?i9.., p. 50. 
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the stable and trot him aroun(J 9.lH:: say, 'here I s the salva-
tion of Kentucky'. ,,62 Fearful that Beckham or some other 
candidate might receive more votes than Rhea in a primary, 
the administration acopted a strategy designed to overcome 
this. A number of candidates or IIfavorite son oandidates lt 
~'ould be induced to enter the primary, making it difficult 
for any contender to secure a msjority of the votes. Tnus 
while Beckham mieht get more votes than Phea, he 'Would 
have f~eat difficulty getting more votes tl~ the combined 
total of all other candidates. 63 
The administration publicly argued that its bill 
would prevent a minority candidate from being nominated, 
implying that it was more demooratic than the single 
primary. On the other hand, the supporters of the single 
primary bill oontended that two primaries would be too 
great an expense for taxpayers. Furthermore, the prospect 
of run-off primaries would be discouraging to good govern-
mer.t because men best qualified to serve the public were 
unWilling to faoe the expense, labor and abuse of two 
nominating races. Such arguments were probably uncon-
vincing to even the most naive of voters. 
In addition to the two Senate measures, two bills were 
introduced in the House. one calling for single primaries 
and the other for run-off primaries. On February 19, 
1935. the run-off bill passed the Senat£ by a vote of 
62re.M., p. 67. 
63Baylor, Talbot, pp. 294-95. 
S2 
tvwnty-tHo to ten. 64 The administration then sought to 
remove from co:rom:1. ttce in 'the House the single primary 
bill. If the;; could SCCI..ll'G passage of thl~ b ill by the 
House, a a talemate could be crea.ted. This itJas attempted 
on February 2$, but fai1e1 when they ''tIerE; unable to ,:'emove 
t}16 bill fl""O;ll the House committee. This attompt 1-18.S 
deff'.lated by a. forty-six to twonty-nine vote. 65 I~ ealizing 
that there was little c:lance of passing a single primary 
bill in a Senate controlled by the ad::u1nistration, and 
belleving that a run-off primary was better tho.n 110 
pri::;;.a,ry, anti-a.dministration meuJ)ers of the House joined 
the Laffoon forces on Febr:lal:'Y 26, and t;assed the run-off 
bill by a. vote of sixty-nine to tHcnt;y.66 
or thn t'llenty ,,"Iho voted against tho '11~asure, nineteen 
were Rcpubllciins, indicating the opposition ,Jf the mlnor-
ity party tc this for:n of ::lomination. One angry hepub-
lican papal' declared: 
The si311ing of the pri..n:ar;y bill had the 
appearance o£ a Democratic 'love feast,' 
l~aders of the admlnistration Dnd anti-
administration factions joking with one 
8n 1)t.hEH" 01.iring the procecdin,3S j uGovernor, 
this is an adopted child in which we are 
plea.sed," remarked Lieutenant Governor 
Chandler. "Well, there will be no doubt 
that a majority will nominate the 
cand ida te ,rt the Governor repl ied .67 
64Ibid., P. 99. 
- -
65Courier-Journal, February 26, 1935, p. 1. 
66!PJ..9.., February 27,1935, p. 1. 
67The Greenburg Record }lerold, February 28, 1935, 
p.l. -
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At a cost of ~~38,ooo for the special legislative 
session, the people of Kentucky had a compulsory primary 
bill. One newspaper termed the passage of the law a 
"victory for the people by the press.n68 Although this 
statement is exaggerated, it is true that the influence of 
public opinion, stimulated by the a~,;ltation of the press, 
was of great importance. "Only the assurance of popular 
support, encouraged and emboldened faithful public 
servants to seize the opportunity to restore the principle 
of popuar su.f'frage," declared the Harlan Laily ;.;.nter-
prise. 69 Equall~ important, however, were the aspirations 
and ambitions of politicians in both factions of the Lemo-
cratic Party. 
Although the enactment of the primary law was a 
victory for democratic government, its passage cannot be 
attributed solely to American dedication to democracy. 
With greater validity, it can be argued that it was but 
another example of the curious combination, of one part 
devotion to democratic rule and one part desire for 
political power, that goes into the making of American 
politics. 
Public sentiment had been satisfied; the people would 
nominate the party candidates. But what effects would the 
measure have on the Democratic Party and the gubernatorial 
election? Ironically enough, the bill was to be the cause 
68Harlan Daily Enterprise, February 27, 1935, p. 1. 
69ill.E.. 
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of the defeat of its supporters and the means of victory 
for those who opposed it. The stage was now readied and 
the cast prepared to present their roles in one of the most 
colorful and exciting political dramas in the statets 
history. 
CHAP'l~ III 
THE S IL~NT VOTE 
Before the enactment of the compulsory primary law 
there was little doubt that the Lemocratic candidate would 
be Thomas S. Rhea of Russellville, Kentucky. Realizing 
this Rhea had written a friend in January: 
Old Friend, just believe me. No matter 
what any newspaper or anyone says I am 
headed for the top of the world, and I 
don't believe any combination can stop 
or hinder me in the least. For I not 
only have a fine organization but which 
is better I have the people of all kinds 
for me. l 
The primary law probably did not destroy his optimism for 
it did not deny him the nomination, but it did mean that 
to obtain it he would have to engage several opponents in 
a political campaign. And there were many who were 
willing to do battle with hirn for the nomination. 
Even betore the controversy surrounding the passage 
of a primary law developed, several individuals had 
expressed interest in the gubernatorial nomination. In 
all, seven !:emocrats campaigned for the nomination, 
although two withdrew from the contest before the deadline 
date for filing as candidates. James Howell Richmond was 
the earliest aspirant to announce his availability for the 
lThomas S. Rhea to Drey Woodson, Januar~ 13, 1935, 
v;oodson Papers. 
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nomination. Richemnd had been elected Superintendent or 
Public Instruction in 1931 with a majority greater than 
.56 
tnat of any other candidate on the Lemocratic ticket. 
turing his tenure as Superintendent of PULlic Instruction, 
Ricrwond was a staunch supporter of better education in 
Kentucky. Unlike many individuals who had filled that 
office, Richmond had served in the field of education as a 
teacher, supervisor, principal and school superintendent.2 
COl'nbining his carrer in the field of education with that 
of politics, he had in 1920 run for the third district 
congressional seat but had been defeated. 3 Despite the 
defeat he remained in politics and in 1932 led the pre-
convention campaiGn in Kentucky for Franklin I. Roosevelt. 
Another man who sought the nomination was Nat B. 
Sewell. Sewell, as state Inspector and Examiner during 
the Laffoon administration, became "one of its most widely 
publicized public officials.H4 This publicity was gener-
ated by the numerous official reports published b~' his 
office. Both Richmond and Sewell withdrew from the 
campaign when it became apparent that they would not 
receive the nomination. 
On the day of the first primary, August 4, Lemo-
cratic voters were presented with five tnen from whom to 
select their gubernatorial candidate. Of the five men 
2Harrodsburg Herald, March 1, 193$, p. 2. 
rurming on the remocratic ticket, Bailey V1ootton made the 
least vigorous campaign and received the fewest votes on 
eleotion day. 
Wootton was a native of Muhlenburg COlmty, looated in 
the southwestern ooal fields of Kentuoky. He had been 
eleoted Attorney General in 1931 and was made ohairman of 
the Democratie Exeoutive Committee the following year. 
nKnown more as a listener than a talker," Wootton had 
avoided "as mveh as possible, partioipation in the fao-
tiona1 controversies tr~t featured the 1932, 1933 and 1934 
sessions of the General Assembly.uS Wootton's speeches, 
when compared with the oolorfulness and vigor of the 
Chandler-Rhea exohanges, appeared almost drab. However, a 
factor more important than this in his defeat was that he 
~Jas relatively unknown to the general public and he lacked 
the organized support of any large segment of the party. 
A similar situation existed 10 the oandidaoy of Elam 
Huddleston, who, like Wootton, lacked SUbstantial backing. 
Luring the Larfoon administration, Huddleston served 8S 
state Treasurer. Prior to the t he had been engaged in the 
investment banking bUsiness in Louisville for a number of 
years.6 Huddleston finished fourth in the Democratic 
primary. 
Huddleston, Wootton, Riohmond, Sewell, Rhea and 
Chandler were all important officia.ls of the La.tfoon 
SIbid. 
6Interview with Huddleston. 
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administration, and all were candidates, at one time or 
another, for the Lemocratic nomination. Only one candi-
date was not identified with the Laffoon aaministration. 
Waging a hard fought campaign, Frederick Wallis, built up 
a large body of supporters. 
The oldest of the gubernatorial candidates in 1935, 
Wallis was born in Christian County in 1869. He had 
enjoyed an active political career prior to 1935, but 
primarily outside of Kentucky's political arena. Presi-
dent Wilson had appointed him Commissioner of Immie~ation, 
a position which he held until the end of the Harding 
administration. 7 After 1924, he was involved for five 
years in New York politics. Returning to Kentucky in 
1929, Wallis soon became active in state politics. His 
campaign in 1935 centered on his advocacy of a conserva-
tive, businessman t3~e of government. This type of ap-
proach, however, had little appeal to Kentuckians during 
the depression years. In the primary, Wallis' vote lagged 
far behind that of Rhea and Chandler. 
Thomas S. Rhea was as experienced and skilled a 
politician as could be found in Kentucky during the 1930's. 
Born in 1871, he was a native of Russellville, the county 
seat of Logan County, located in south-Central Kentucky. 
Although Rhea served in numerous small offices and was a 
veteran of many polit ical campaigns, he possessed the 
reputation of being "more of an organizer than a stump 
7Harrodsburg Hera16, i'1arch 1, 1935, p. 2. 
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speaker. tlB He began his career in politics by serving as 
assistant in the office of Colonel Joshua t. Powers, U. S. 
Collector of Internal Revenue at owensboro. 9 Returning to 
his home in 1905, he was elected sheriff of Logan County. 
Involvement in state polit1cs started for him in 1911 when 
he was elected state treasurer. Extremely active in the 
years that followed, he served as a delegate to the 
national conventions in 1912, 1920, 1924 and 1932.10 fie 
also directed the state campa1gns of Beckham in the sen-
atorial race of 1914 and in the Democratic primar;y of 
1927, and directed the campaign of A. 0. Stanley who ran 
successfully for the Senate in 1919.11 
Although Rhea had tremendous success in managing the 
campaigns of other candidates, he was unable to achieve as 
many victories for himself at the polls. In 1915 he was 
defeated in an election for state auditor and in 1928 he 
unsuccessfully ran for Congress in the Third Congressional 
District. Facing certain defeat in his bid for the guber-
natorial nomination in 1919, he withdrew without finishing 
the race. 12 
Rhea occupied a very influential position in the 
Laffoon administration. He quickly became the governor's 
B~. 





most trusted adviser and was "generally credited with 
having organized the 1934 legislature for Laffoon ... 13 His 
importance was indicated in his appointment to the Highway 
Commission in 1932. As the split developed between Ben 
Johnson and Laffoon, Rhea's influenoe increased. ~~en 
Johnson was removed from the Highway Commission, Rhea 
assumed the chairmanship of that body. 
Regardless of his earlier failures at the polls, in 
the spring, 1935, Rhea seemed assured of the nomination. 
Cognizant of this fact, anti-administration forces at-
tempted to reach an accord with Rhea. In early April, 
1935, Rhea was approached by Elwood Hamilton, law partner 
of Beckham, and an influential Lemocrat in Louisville 
politics, lilo suggested that Rhea travel with him to vJash-
ington to se~ Barkley. He further suggested that Rhea 
talk with Haly in Louisville. Viewing this as an attempt 
by the Beckham-Haly group to draft his platform and select 
the rest of his ticket, Rhea refused to meet with either 
Barkley or Haly.14 
The only real opposition confronting Rhea lay in the 
candidate supported by the anti-administration faction. 
But Rhea believed that he was prepared for any candidate 
advanced by this group, fully expecting it to be Beckham. 
But for months Beckham refused to say whether or not he 
13Harrodsburg Herald, March 1, 1935, p. 2. 
li~Thomas S. Rhea to Urey Woodson, April IS, 1935, 
vJooason Papers. 
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would run. Meanwhile, It-Jootton .. Rhea, and Richmond had all 
officially announced their candidacy and be!~un to campaign 
for the nomination. 1S Already laboring under a number of 
disadvantages, the Johnson-Talbot-Chandler faction felt 
the urgent need to obtain a candidate who could begin cam-
paigning. 
Then, on April 25, BeC~lam announced ti~t he would 
not seek thfJ l.Jemocratic nomination. Contradictory evidence 
can be found to explain Beckl18.m t s decision. Orval BaJlor, 
in his book J. Lan Talbot. Champion of Good Government, 
states, without citing his source of authority, that Beck-
ham told Talbot that he would not rUl! because "his poli t-
ical career had been long and stormy and he had no desire 
to prolong it. Old age, too, had crept upon him ~ld he 
did not feel equal to the ta.sk his friends would impose 
upon him.nl6 Finally, Beckham. stated that "Mrs. Beckham 
also had influenced him by 1nd icating that the prospect of 
his candidacy was distasteful to her.,,17 J.lueh. of th.e 
material in Baylor's book is of trus variety and it seems 
likely that Talbot did recount the story to the author. 
That Talbot was told of Bec~~ls decision prior to his 
public announcement 1s verified by Chandler, with whom 
15courier-Journal, March 14, April 1, April 19, 1935. 
Wootton announced his candidacy on March 13, Rhea his on 
March 30 and Richmond on April 16, 1935. 
10saylor, Talbot .. p. 317. 
17~. 
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Talbot talked immediately after seeing BeCkham.18 Thus it 
is probable that such a conversation did take place. But 
that Beckham's decision was made for these reasons is 
questionable. There is some evidence which suggests that 
Beckham was anxious to run for governor again, but was 
dissuaded by friends, who having seen him defeated three 
times, twice for United states Senator, and once for gov-
ern or, felt that his cand idacy at that t.ime would not be 
advisable .19 Fossibly Talbot, who seems to have been most 
responsible for organisation of the anti-administration's 
campaign, was influential in persuading Beckham not to 
run. 
Informed by Talbot of Beckham's decision, Chandler 
immediatel~ called a press conference where he announced 
his own candidacy, declaring that he sought the nomination 
on~y beoause Beckham was disinolined to do so. }O'or sev-
eral reasons, Chandler's candidaoy was more advantageous 
to the anti-administration faction than that of Beckruun. 
The most important factor was that Chandler was the avowed 
anti-administration man behind whom all antl-administra-
tion elements could unite. A relative newcomer to pol-
itics, Chandler had alienated few outside the administra-
tion faction. On the other hand, Beokham's anti-racing 
platform in 1927 had displeased many Central Kentucky 
Democrats who would be free to march under Chandler's 
18rnterview with Chandler. 
19Urey "!oodson to r·aniel C. Roper, July 12, 1935, 
V';ood90n Papers. 
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banner. Anottl.or faotor in Chandler's favor was that muoh 
of Johnson's following in the Fourth Congressional District 
was an anti-Beokham vote that Johnson could deliver to 
Chandler but which he would have difficulty delivering to 
Beckham. Finally, the most favorable factor in Chandler's 
candidacy was his opposition against the sales tax and his 
fight for the compulsory primary. These two issues tended 
to popularize Chandler at a time when Beckham was in 
political retirement. 
'oJi thout the sales tax and primary issues" Chandler 
would have been in 1935 a relatively unknown politician. 
Like Beckham, Chandler had been e leoted lieutenant ~ove:r'nor 
at the relatively early age of thirty-seven years. born in 
Corydon, in Western Kentucky, Chandler t s life was of the 
Horatio Alger variety. His parents separated while he was 
very young, and he spent most of his ~outh living with dif-
ferent aunts and unoles. 20 Striking out on his own while 
still an adolesoent, he finanoed his secondary education 
and college. In 1924 he earned a law degree at the 
University of Kentucky and five years later was eleoted 
state senator. 21 
Kentucky's I}emocrats were presented with a varietJi of 
cand idates, all possess ing different backgrounds and q ual-
ifications. For those who believed the state needed the 
guidance of a young man there was Chandler. Voters who 
2Owillis, Kentucky lemocracdl p. 24. 
21..!lli., p. 27. 
preferred a man who possessed a great deal of experi.ence 
in politics could support Rhea. Advocates of a conserva-
tive approach to government had a representative in 
\iallis, while those who liked a candidate with a bacl{-
ground in financial matters could cast their ballot for 
Huddleston. The Republioans lacked this variety, but they 
also avoided the factional strife which characterized the 
l;emocratlc campaign. 
II 
Althou~~ the Democratic primary overshadowed it, the 
Republicans also nominated their candidate in a primary. 
Three men sought the Republican nOmination, but there never 
was any real opposition made to the candidacy of King 
Swope. 
Swope was a native of Danville, Kentucky and a res-
ident of Fayette County, located in the heart of Ken-
tucky's Bluegrass region. His political career began in 
1919, when, at the age ot twenty-five, he was elected to 
Congress from the Seventh District. 22 In 1931 he was 
appointed by Governor Flem Sampson as Twenty-Second 
Circuit Judge. He subsequently, was elected to serve out 
the remainder of the term of the previous circuit judge 
and in 1933 he was elected to that office for a full six-
year term.23 
22Courier-Journal, September 24, 1961, p. 2. 
23~. 
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Providing only minor opposition to tel6 Swope cancli-
dacy were Judge r. M. Bingham of Pineville and Judge Sam 
Hurst of Beattyville. Neither candidate campaigned exten-
sively nor reoeived substantial public support. The sig-
nificanoe of their candidacies lay in the fact that they 
gave the Republican contest the nominal appearance of a 
primary. Swope largely ignored both Bingham and Hurst, 
conducting his campaign as if he had already secured the 
nomination. 
The Republicans traditionally had chosen their can-
didates by convention, but with the passage of the com-
pulsory primary law this course of action was closed to 
them. With the entry of more than one gubernatorial can-
didate, even though they presented little opposition, some 
Republicans became alarmed that the disharmony which was 
disrupting the Democratic Party threatened the G. O. P. 
To ciroumvent the primary law and offset the threat posed 
by multiple candidates, the Republican Executive Committee 
announced on June 1, 1935, that a convention would be held 
at Lexington on June 18, for the purpose of recommending 
Republican candidates for all elective offices exoept that 
of governor. 24 Although the decision of tl~ convention 
could not be final, it was obvious that the leaders would 
tolerate no opposition to the choices made. These leaders 
apparently sought to place the strongest possible ticket 
on the ballot; one which would allow them to capitalize on 
24~., September 24, 1961, p. 2. 
66 
the split within Lemocratic ranks. 
After the convertion Has called. speculation was 
raised in some quarters that a few Republican leaders were 
dissatisfied with Judge King Swope and were considering 
placing another man in the field as the organization can-
didate for governor. This question was first raised by 
the Democratic Lexington Herald which stated: Itfl"he amuse-
ment the Republican Party enjoyed because of the strife 
between the Lemocrats, is being threatened by discord and 
factionalism within their own party. H25 The Lexington 
paper argued that the resignation of Federal Judge Charles 
Lawson which occurred on the same day the convention was 
announced, was an indication of possible disharmony within 
the Republican Party. r:awson in his statement of resigna-
tion said that he would continue to serve on the bench 
until a successor was appointed and sworn in, provided 
that it was not later than June 1.5. 26 'l'he paper claimed 
that June 15 was extremely significant because it was "the 
date generally decided upon as the beginning of the 
intensive gubernatorial campaig~."27 The paper also noted 
that Lawson had been the Republican's gubernatorial candi-
date in 1923 and he remained one of his party's leaders. 
The paper concluded that all of this indicated dissension 
wi thin the party. Finally, the paper pointed to the fact 
2.5Lexington Herald, June 2, 193.5, p. 1. 
26Ibid. 
27.!£!2.. 
that while the Republican Committee excluded the guber-
natorial candidate from those to be recommended, it did 
not endorse the candidacy of Swope. 
These aocusations were refuted by Republican papers 
such as the Lexington Leader and Cincinnat1 EnqUirer. 
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Both papers denied that Dawson sought the nomination and 
both charged that those who drew suoh implications frOM 
his resignation were merely attempting to distraot voters' 
attentions from the fighting in the Democratic Party. COM-
menting on this subject the Lexington Leader declared: 
In announcing his decision, Judge Dawson 
said he was stepping down from the bench in 
order to enter private practice and thus 
increase his earnings. That would have been 
an extremely impolitic statement for a 
prospective oandidate to make, but some J)emo-
crats, overlooking absurdity of the prognosti-
cation in their eagerness to find some otstacle 
in the way of Circuit Judge King Swope, 
advanced the idea that Judge Lawson might have 
his eye on the mansion. 28 
Expressing opinions similar to those of the LeXington 
Leader, William Mason, Frankfort correspondent for the 
Cincinnati EnqUirer concluded: 
Judge I'awson' s announcement said he was 
retiring so he could re-enter private 
life to make prOVision for his family. 
Kentucky's graveyard of the governor-
ship from which only an oocasional 
Laz.arus emerges, hardly can be oounted 
as the lure that makes Judge f;awson 
resign from the Federal bench.29 
No evidence, other than the article of the Lexington 
28Lexlngton Leader, June 9, 1935. p. 1. 
29Cincinnati Enquirer, June 9. 1935. p. L~. 
Herald, "HiS found which su-' gested that Judge lawson Ever 
considered running in the 1935 primary. It see~s liKely 
that the opinions of the Lexington Le~ and Cincinnati 
Enquirer were aocurate. 
J;espite the foreoasts of possible stormy proceedings 
at the convention, ttle recoMmendations were made with 
little controversy. If any Hepublioan leaders were dis-
satisfied wIth Swope's oandidacy, there was no outward 
indication of it at the oonvention. Altho1..~gh the conven-
tion was to reoonL-1'lend no gubernatorial candidate, scores 
of count:; oonventions, which met to seleot delegates to 
the state meeting, passed resolutions endorsing the oan-
didacy of King Swope. 30 It seeF~ probable that no guber-
natorial recommendation was made by the convention beoause 
Swope ha(~ the support of almust all RepublicarJs. 
Tl"le Republican convention met at Lexington with 
little conflict. The only significant battle occurred in 
the choice of t::le candidate for attorney general. Laniel 
['avies of Newport obta.ined the recommendation by beating 
Paul Basham of B.ardinburg. Before Lavies won, however, 
several bitter quarrels and a fist fight had occurred. 31 
This struggle developed beoause "of the failure of the 
party's leaders to 'slate' in pre-convention conferences a 
northern Kentuckian. The northern delegation, controlling 
30Courier-Journal, June 16, 1935, p. 3. 
31Kentucky Post. June 19, 1935, clip~ing in King 
Swope Scrapbooks, Archives livision, Nargaret King Library, 
University of Kentucky. 
a large b100k of votes, organized for the fight on the 
floor and refused to yield an inoh during the balloting 
that brought Lavies t reoonrnendation. 1t32 
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In the other contests, oandidates not on the recom-
mended slate drawn up by party leaders "withdrew" without 
being nominated, or quit before the roll call was oom-
pleted. Th.e recommendations passed by the convention were 
the same as those that appeared on the ballots in the 
November general election. J. J. Kavanagh of Louisville 
became the Republican Party's candidate for lieutenant 
governor. The nomination for secretary of state went to 
Catherine ',. j'';orrow of Somerset while that of auditor went 
to J. b. Allen of Paintsville. Charles Cole of Harlan 
sought the office of state treasurer and W. J. Moore of 
Richmond ran for the office of superintendent of public 
instruction. The rest of Republican ticket was made up of 
Andrew Alexander, candidate for commissioner of agri-
culture and Joseph Martin, candidate for clerk of the 
court of appeals.33 "Geographic recognition was the most 
conspicuous asset of the ticket slated by the Hepub-
licans."34 On the ticket there were candidates from 
Western, Southcentral, Southeas tern, Northern Kentucky and 
from the Bluegrass and Louisville regions of the state. 
32Kentucky Times Star, June 19, 1935, clipping in 
Swope Scrapbooks. 
33courier-Journal, June 19. 1935, p. 1. 
34!!?!2.. 
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Republicans saw in the convention a wa.:i of guarantee-
ing a strone ticket on election day. ThE Lemocratic can-
diaate later made an issue of the convention, charging that 
Swope rfrepresented a system that believes in government by 
a few men rather than by the masses. • •• ft 35 Speaking of 
the Republican convention on one occasion, Chandler 
asserted: "The Republican tioket was named by the Hepub-
lican bosses at 8 boss-controlled convention, and then 
forced down the throats of 150,000 Republican voters in 
their primary."36 However, not many Republicans agreed 
with the assertions of Chandler. Their sentiments were 
expressed in papers such as the Casey County News which 
stated: 
Harmony was the keynote. The convention 
had a song of hate (for the Laffoon 
administration and the sales tax), a song 
of love (for Judge King Swope who spoke 
briefly). • •• It is the consensus of 
opinion that an outstanding ticket has 
been commended to the voters of the atate. 38 
Tne convention over, the Republicans were prepared to 
wage a spirited election oampaign. 
35~., October 19, 1935, p. 2. 
36.!E.!.2. •• October 16, 1935, p. l~. 




By the first of May the candidates of both political 
parties were traveling throughout the state delivering 
campaign speeches. Earliest of the Republicans to start 
campaigning was King Swope. In all his addresses, 1~ 
directed his attacks against the I;emocratic candidates, 
principally Rhea and Chandler, and for the most part 
ignored the other Republican candidates whom he was sup-
posedly contesting for the nomination. He conducted tus 
entire primary campair.,ll as if he were already the Repub-
lican nominee. At first he concentrated his assault upon 
the factionalism and what he considered inefficiency of 
the Laffoon administration. On one occasion the Republi-
can candidate declared: 
Of the present state administration, it 
can now be truthfully said that the state 
is in the octopus-like clutches of the 
most corrupt, the most incompetent, the 
most extravagant and the most oppressive 
administration that
8
ever disgraced the 
state of Kentucky.3 
Until mid-May Swope continued the campaign strategy 
of attacking the administration. In June, he suddenly 
relented in his attacks. Prior to that time Swope had been 
"campaignin!:s the state as if it were late October, the 
settlement of issues two weeks away. He worked hard 
38Lexington Leader, March 31, 193$, p. 1. 
72 
although the general opinion was that he had the Hepub-
lican nomination sewed up.n39 This change of pace in 
Swope's campaign occurred simultaneously with an increase 
in the rervency of the Democratic campaigns. The Lemo-
cratic primary had beoome extremely heated, with four or 
the five oanoidates making speeohes whioh could only do 
harm to the oandidate support~d by the administration. 
Chandler was not the only Democratio candidate attaoking 
the administration. Wootton, Huddleston and Wallis, all 
oritioized the Latfoon-Rhea management of state affairs. 
The slowing of Swope's oampaign pace was obviously made in 
the realization that oritioisms of Lartoon and Rhea carried 
more conviction when uttered by other Democrats. More im-
portantly, Republioan chances of success in November could 
possibly be enhanced by intensirying the split within the 
I:emocratic Party. The easiest way or acoomplishing this 
would be to remain as quiet as possible. thus freeing the 
Democrats to right among themselves. nAnd the quieter • • 
Swope became, the heavier became the .firing at the Laffoon-
Rhea control. n 40 
While Swope engaged in this type of oampaign, the 
other Republican candidates delivered only a few speeohes. 
These attraoted little attention and were of minute impor-
tance in the election. 
Unlike their Republioan counterparts, the five 
39Courier-Journal, July 21, 193.5, p. 10. 
40Ibid. 
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I>emocratio oandidates battled one another for the nomina-
tion. As election day neared, more and more of the 
speeohes of Wootton, Huddleston, 'VJallis and Chandler were 
directed against the Laffoon-Rhea control. The pounding 
away at the candidacy of Thomas Rhea by the other four 
oandidates was due to the faot that Rhea, with the backing 
of the Laffoon administration, was generally conceded to 
have a marked advantage in the primary. 
Officially opening his oampaign at a barbecue and 
rally on June 9, Rhea worked hard to win the nomination. 
He took little notice of candidates other than Chandler, 
who he depicted as a man with small intelligence and no 
real grasp of tl~ state's needs. Rhea argued that if 
Chandler was permitted to revoke the sales tax he would 
undermine the financial struoture of the state. Further-
more, Chandler's pledge to do so, Rhea asserted, was an 
indioation of his unrealistic approaoh to the eoonomic 
problems of the state. 
Rhea was especially critioal of Chandler's relation-
ship with Ben Johnson and Lan Talbot. Aocording to Rhea, 
Johnson's support of Chandler was motivated, not by Chand-
ler's stand on the various issues, but by the "faot that 
an army of Mr. Jchnsonts relatives had been on the state's 
payroll during Mr. Johnson's tenure as State Highway Com-
missioner.ltl.).l Alleging that these relatives had drawn 
$'128,000 in four years, Rhea said, "naturally they fight 
4l Ibid., July 1!~. 1935. p. 7. 
-
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being weaned away from the public teat. n42 He continually 
desc!'i bed Chandler "as a putty man in the hands of Uncle 
ben JorJ.1lson" or as a .. jumping jack who jumps when Ben 
Johnson pulls the strings. "43 Chandler r'esponded to these 
charges by observing: "I was not putty in the hands of 
Tom and Ruby when they were trying to dlsinfranchise every 
voter in the state by denying you a primary."44 
Rhea denounced not only Chandler but also Johnson. 
Speaking figuratively of Johnson's association with the 
Sampson administration, whioh it will be reoalled was 
formed for the purpose of defeating Beokham, fihea stated: 
"In 1927 I saw Ben Johnson shoot from ambush the man who 
is now using honey words for hlm."4S With referenoe to 
Johnson's association with Laffoon, Rhea declared that he 
had "saved a Demooratic administration from Ben Johnson 
when he saw the latter 'crouched with a knife in his hand' 
ready to stab the administration in the back."46 Also in 
a figurative manner, Johnson repudiated Rhea's assertions 
by declaring: 
I can't express myself in the face of 
the utter hellishness of such a false-
hood. When Tom Rhea said I had a knife 
drawn on Laffoon he lied. I've not been 
armed for years and am not going to arm 
42~. 
43~., August 3, 1935, p. 1-1-. 
1.j.4.!£.!£., August 24, 1935, p. 5. 
1~5Lexin8ton Herald, August 3, 1935, p. 1. 
46aerald Post, August 1, 1935, p. 1. 
myself, but I would be afraid to meet a 
man in the dark who would utter such a 
charge as Tom Thea uttered.lt 1 
15 
All of Rhea's speeches were not devoted to a denunci-
ation of Chandler and his associates. He continually 
defended the measures of the Laffoon administration. 
Measures, such as the sales tax, he argued were neoessary 
to permit the state to meet the emergency caused by the 
depression. Another dominant theme in Rhea's campaign was 
that the aotions of the Chandler faction were destroying 
the Lemocratic Party in Kentucky. One of his favorite 
statements dealing with the factionalism which had dis-
rupted the party was that there "must be a pruning of the 
political barnacles th.at nave so long clung to our ship of 
state."48 
While Rhea was directing his attention to Chandler, 
the three minor candidates and Chandler directed their 
attacks upon the Lar~oon administration. Wootton dealt in 
personalities to a lesser degree than any of the other 
candidates, confining most of his speeches to economic 
matters. Al though he had aided Laffoon and Rhea in their 
fight for the sales tax, in the primary contest he voiced 
opposition to its re-enactment. Under the provisions of 
the 1934 law, the sales tax would be removed, unless re-
enacted by the legislature, in June, 1936. To replace the 
revenue received through the sales tax, Wootton promised 
l~7Courier-Journal, August 3, 193.5, p. 4. 
J.j.8Lexington Heral<', August ), 1935. p. 1. 
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to reduce governmental expenses, " .. hich he arr:uea would 
result 1n a savings of more than four m11110n dollars an-
nually. If this did not meet the state's needs he would 
levy s. p.,l'aduated income tax.49 The rest of \'liootton's 
platform embodied those principles wrdch are enumerated so 
often in poli tics.l addresses that they hs.ve acquired a 
sanctity second only to that of the Ten Commandments. 
Among other things, he advocated representation of all the 
people 1n the administration of the governmen t, fmd the 
further reorganization of the state govermm.ent for greater 
50 e.ffic iene y. 
'It:ootton was joined by Frederick Wallis in his indlct-
nt0nt of the management of the stAte's finances. Advocat-
ing measures such as removal of eduoati on from politics, 
use of the highway department oruy for non-politioal pur-
poses, and describing the sales tax as "an abomlnati.on," 
\1allis pledged to the voters a business-like administra-
tion of the state government. In dealing with the fao-
tional split within his party, Wallis concluded in a 
manner wholly favorable to himself, that the two faotions 
were so bitterly aligned against eaoh other that it was 
very unlikely that the losing group would support the 
winner in November. The only hope for a Demooratic vic-
tory, then, rested in the nomination of a man not aligned 
with either faotion, who could unite all elements of the 
49Courier-Journal, July 10, 1935, p. lt~. 
SO~., August 1, 1935, p. 22. 
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party.5l 
In hls bld for the nomination, Elam Huddleston, also 
dealt extensively with m9.tters of a financial nature. Un-
like \iootton, \-Ja1118 and Chandler, Huddleston endorsed the 
sales tax, but with the necessities of llfa, such as food 
and clothing exempted. To replenish the state treasury, 
~le proposed an income tax, a reduction in expenses, and a 
"klcking out of the politlcal crooks, and thieves, be they 
Democrats or Hepublicans. n 52 A measure proposed solely by 
Huddleston was the taxing of holders of tax-exempt securi-
tles, who, Huddleston stated, were "those most able to pay 
taxes but who do not have to pay.nS3 
Of interest to all the Democratic candidates, was the 
endorsement of J. C. W. Beckham. But it was July before he 
made any announcement. Prior to the announcement all the 
caIldidates claimed that they had the support of Beckham's 
fol1owlng. Vespl te the claims of the asplrants and tlle 
delay by Beckham in declarlng his cholce, there was really 
little doubt whomhe would support. He was closely associ-
ated wlthElwood Hamilton, Percy Haly, Robert W. Bingham, 
all of whom supported Chandler. Baylor states that Beck-
ham had told Talbot, at the time he informed him of his 
decision not to run, that he would support Chandler, but 
51Lc xington Herald, August 3, 1935, 1=-. 1. 
52Couri~r-Journal, July 21, 193~, p. 8. 
53~. 
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that he wanted to handle the matter himself.51~ This story 
appears legitimate because of the assistance rendered 
Chandler by Beckham after he announced his endorsement of 
Chandler's candidacy. 
Chandler's oampaign was unsurpassed in energy and 
vitality. Opening it at Newport on May 9, Chandler 
labeled Rhea "Sales Tax Tom," charging that Rhea and Laf-
foon had brought about the passage of the sales tax "in 
order to provide more funds for a political machine to 
further thwart the will of the people.,,55 The sales tax 
issue became a dominant theme in Chandler's campaign and 
proved to be his most effective weapon. He repeatedly 
pledged to repeal the sales tax if elected, but never 
clearly stated in what manner he would replace the revenue 
brought in by the tax. 
In his ca~aign addresses there was also found the 
jargon of the aspiring politician. He promised to promote 
more efficient 80vernment through a "strict budgetary 
control of expenditures," adjustment of the tax prop~am 
"to produce only sufficient revenue to meet the necessary 
reqUirement," and the appointment of "honest, conscien-
tious, capable, and faithful men and women."56 In his 
speeches, Chandler also drew attention to areas of needed 
reform in Kentucky. He denounced the deplorable cond1timls 
54Baylor, Talbot, p. 317. 
SSCourier-Journal, May 10, 1935, p. 9. 
56Ibid. 
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which existed in the penal and charitable institutions and 
pledged himself to correct them if elected governor. 
As Au:.ust 3, the day for the pri;Gar;y, approached, 
each candidat~ expressed confidence in his own ultimate 
victory. The weather was clear and warm across the state 
on election day and over 600,000 voters marched to the 
polls. As had been expected Swope easily defeated his 
other two opponents, thus securing the Republican nomina-
tion. In a one-sided vote Swope received 139,985 votes, 
Judge Bingham 13,490 and Judge Hurst, a vote of 10,670.57 
The rest of Swope's slate was also nominated. 
The vote in the t.emocratic primary showed little 
resemblance to that in the Republican primary. Although 
the voter turnout was not as large as that in the 1932 
Presidential election, it was greater than Laffoon's in 
1931 and was the largest ever in a primary. "r-lormallya 
vote of approximately 300,000 could be expected in a liem-
ocrat1c primary.tt58 In 1927, 299,673 Democrats had voted 
in the primary. Almost a decade later, in 1935, 1+h9,89l 
Lemocrats indicated their choice for the gubernatorial 
candidate. 59 The length of time between the 1927 and 1935 
primaries lessens somewhat the significance of the in-
crease. However, in the 1932 senatorial primary only 
57Election Returns (primaries), Office of Secretary 
of State, Frankfort, Kentucky. 
58Courier-Journal, August 4, 1935, p. 10. 
59Malcolm f. Jewell, KentuckJ Votes (Lexington: 
University of Kentucky Press, 196 ), ii, 15. 
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187,420 I:emocrats voted. 60 This sw;gests that the in-
crease in tn.e 193.5 pl·inuH'Y 'Has not merely the result of an 
increase in potential voters. uf f;reatest significance 
was the influence of the depression on voter behavior. 
r,uring those years J discontent was expressed oftentimes at 
the polls. In Kentucky voter participation increased 
tremendously during the 1930's. This was particularly true 
of the gubernatorial primaries. For instance, 516,021 
Lemocrats participated in the 1939 gubernatorial primary, 
as compared to 253,136 in 191+3 and 288,2.52 in 194'7. 61 'j1his 
trend continued even into the 1950's Wl'len only slightly 
more than 300,000 voted in the 1951 gubernatorial primary. 
Thus the large vote in the 1935 primary can be partially 
attributed to the general increase in voter interest dur-
ing the depression. At the same time, the intense nature 
of the campaign generated interest which was demonstrated 
at the polls. 
Rhea received the largest vote in the primarJ with a 
total of 203,010. Although Chandler, with a vote of 
189,515, received 15,000 fewer votes than Rhea, he still 
polled a vote ~reater than that given any candidate in a 
previous gubernatorial primary. The other three Lemo-
cratic candidates received a combined total of 57,307. 
~Jal1is got the highest vote of the three with 3B,410. 
Huddleston reoeived 15,501 votes and Wootton got 3,395. 62 
601.£.!.£., I) 21. 
62~., p. 15. 
61~., II, 21, 27, 31. 
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A county by county analysis of ttle 1927 anc; 1935 
primaries shows that the increase in voting was general 
over all of the state. However, certain areas had greater 
increases than others. Of the thirty-two counties which 
showed an increase of nearly 50% or better. nineteen were 
located in the eastern mountain region of the state. Since 
the Civil tdar, this area had been the bulwark of Repub-
licanism in the state. A general increase in I,em.ocratio 
voters in this region oan be attributed to the faot that 
it 'Was the hardest hit by the depression. The policies 
and programs of the Roosevelt administration did much to 
increase Lemocratic voters in the area. Furtl~rmnre. the 
United Mine ltlorkers, which usually endorsed I;emocratic 
candidates during this period, was actively organizing in 
the state I s eastern ooal fields. 
Of the nineteen counties in Eastern Kentucky which 
showed marked increases in voter participation, s1xteen 
cast a majority of their votes for Rhea. This can be 
explained by looking at the voting patterns of the 1925 
and 1927 gubernatorial primaries. In both elections, Lemo-
crats had to ohose between an administration and anti-
administration candidate. In both primaries, ~astern 
Kentucky had given the administration candidate large 
majorities. This can be attributed to the fact that the 
incumbent administration was oftentimes strongest in those 
areas with little local patrona0e. As the number of Lemo-
cratlc voters increased in the area, Rhea, as til.e 
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a.dministration's candidate, naturally became the reaipient 
of' n large pel'centage of the increase. 
Actually Hhea' s cains were not as great as the;}, first 
appear. Chandler made slig11t gains in some northeastern 
counties, such as Rowan, Elliott, and Carter - which had 
been alif~ed with the administration in 1927. Further-
more, although Chandler carried only three of counties in 
the ree"lon which showed sharp increases in voter partici-
pation, they were the more heavily populated Harlan, 
Floyd, Bnd Pike counties. Harlan County had an amazing 
increase of over 1800%. It cast a large majority for 
Chandler. 
Seven more of the counties which had large increases 
in voter participation were located in the south-central 
and Penrlyroyal regions of the state. This was Hhea t s home 
territory and he amassed large votes in all of these 
counties. This was particularly sir,nlficant for it was a 
part of the state which had gl ven overwhelming support to 
anti-ad~tnistration candidates prior to 1935. 
In all, Rhea carried twenty-eight out of the thirty-
two counties having greater than average increases in 
lemocratic voting. The other two of these counties which 
Rhea carried were ~ebBter and Union, both located in the 
Owensboro-Henderson area of v'lestern Kentucky. Prior to 
1935, the anti-administration fa.ction rUlci enjoyed a slight 
advantage in thnt erea. 'l'he s~dtch was not decisive for 
the anti-administration forces recaptured Urlion County in 
83 
the run-off primary. 
The most important county showing a tremendous growth 
in voter participation was Jefferson County. As the most 
populated county in the state, Jefferson County and Louis-
ville was the scene of intense campaigning by both Rhea 
and Chandler. Although both candidates publicly voiced 
assurances of carrying the county, the pre-election fore-
casters were predicting that Rhea, who had the backing of 
Mayor Neville Miller of Louisville, and of the pOy,serful 
organization of Mike Brennan, would get the most votes in 
the county. As the early returns were counted it appeared 
that Rhea would carry the heavily populated area by a 
large plurality. This lead was accumulated in preCincts 
in the central section of Louisville. As the ballots from 
the out-lying precinots of the county were counted Fhea' s 
lead slowly diminished. The counting was extrer1lely slolrJ 
by present-day standards and as late as August 10, Rhea 
still maintained a marginal lead. But in the final tab-
ulation Chandler carried the county by the narrow margin 
o£ six hundred votes. 63 Several factors account for 
Chandler's victory in Jefferson County. His opposition to 
the sales tax earned him the support of Louisville's lead-
ing merchants. There was also the fact that Chandler was 
supported by Leland Taylor, political rival of Mike Bren-
Ilan in Louisville politics. 
631bid., p. 14. In Jefferson County Chandler polled 
24,165 votes and Rhea 23,565 votes. 
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Rhea's strength was concentrated principally in West-
ern, South-Central, ano South-E:astern Kentucky, while most 
of Chandler's support carne from the central bluegrass and 
northern regions of the state. There are, of course, 
exceptions to this generalization. For instance, Rhea 
carried Carroll and Gallatin counties in Northern Kentucky, 
while Chandler took Harlan County in Eastern Kentucky and 
Warren County in the southern portion of the state. This 
pattern differs somewhat from that laid down in the 1923 
and 1927 primaries. The changes in Eastern Kentucky l~ve 
already been noted, as has Rhea's gains in south-central 
and Pennroyal sections of the state. The Jaokson Purchase 
region had been overwhelmingly anti-administration in 1923 
and 1927. In 1935, Rhea made substantial gains, carrying 
three of its counties. However, the anti-administration 
forces still were predominant, with Chandler taking two 
counties and the other three candidates carrying tl~ee 
counties. Rhea also made inroads into anti-administration 
country in the western Coal and Mountain region of the 
state. In this area Rhea did well in Butler, Crittenden, 
Hopkins, Mulhenberg, Livingston, Ohio and Lyon counties. 
Much of Rhea's vote in this region can be attributed to 
Laffoon whose home was there. 
Rhea 1 s gains in these regions were offset by anti-
administration gains in the Bluegrass and north.ern sections 
of the state. Before 1935, the Bluegrass area had been 
fairly evenly divided between the administration and 
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Bl'lti-administration forces. In 1935, this area was solid-
ly pro-Chandler. The. I'easons for this are many. First of 
all, Chand let" s horne was in Versailles, Tllihich is located 
in the heart of the Bluegrass region. Secondly, opposition 
to the sales tax was great there. Lastly, Ii gl"'ea t deal of 
Johnson's support lay in this area. Perhaps the most 
startling change in 1935 was found in Northern Kentucky. 
In 1923, and 1927, this area fl.lild been very pro-administra-
tion. Chanoler carried all but Carl'o11 and Gallatin 
counties. Much of the opposition to tr£ sales tax cen-
tered in the Covington-Newport area, and this probably 
accounts for Chandler's vote in Northern Kentucky in 1935. 
Irhis geographical division of the state by the two 
major candidates is fairly obvious. Not so appat'6nt is 
the fact that for the most part, Rhea carried the poorBr 
counties in the state while Chandler acquired the vote of 
a greater number of the wealthle~' cOUI"lties. Of the coun-
t1es with property values of Olle to twenty dollars per 
acre, Chandler took twenty-one and Rhea fort y-two. 64 Of 
those counties with property values of twenty-one to fifty 
dollars, Rhea carried seventeen as oompared to Chandler 1 s 
twenty-two. Tl~ civision between wealthier and poorer 
counties is demonstrated by the fact that of the oounties 
wi th property values of f 1:Cty to OIle hundred dollars per 
acre, thirteen voted for Chandler and only three for 
641). S. Census Bureau, 1940 Census: Agriculture 




This division is further exemplified in a comparison 
of the rent value of housing in each of the counties. l"or 
example, there were sixty-seven counties whose values 
ranged from three to nine dollars.66 From this total, 
Rhea carried forty-six counties as compared to Chandler's 
twenty-one. Of fort~-five counties whose housing units 
rented at an average value of from nine to twent~-one 
dollars, twenty-nine cast majorities for Chandler, willle 
Rhea carried only sixteen. 67 
There is no single explanation for the fact that Rhea 
attracted more support in the poorer counties of the state. 
Part of it can be attributed to the administration's 
pa tronage which con trolled many of the votes 10 the poorer 
counties. This was particularly true of Eastern Kentucky. 
Many of the less wealthy counties were located in the 
southern and western portions of the state. This was 
rUlea's home territory. 
Much. of Chandler's support in Central Kentucky can 
also be attributed to the fact that it was his home. More 
important, however, was his opposition to the sales tax 
which earned him the support of Kentucky's Retail Merchants 
Association. This organization had actively opposed the 
65Ibid. 
66t;. S. CEnsus Bureau, 19ltO Census: Housin~ (Wash-
ington: Government Printing Office, 191)2), II, 81-95. 
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passage of the sales tax throughout La£foon's administra-
tion. The association did not accept defeat with the 
passage of the bill. Instead, it immediately started to 
work to prevent its re-€nactment. This could be aCCOM-
plished easily if a candidate could be elected who opposed 
the sales tax. The organization thus sent out numerous 
circulars to its members urging them to vote and support 
any candidate opposed to the tax. 68 The activity of this 
group was concentrated in the northern and central regions 
and in the Louisville area. Undoubtedly, their efforts 
were of value to Chandler. In fact, some of the bulletins 
o£ the organization specifically endorsed his candidacy. 
Organized labor was inactive in the first primary. 
No evidence has been uncovered to indicate that any of the 
railroad unions or other unions supported either Rhea or 
Chandler. 
The role of Negro voting is difficult to ascertain. 
No direct appeal was made to that segment of the popula-
tion by either candidate. However, it is interesting to 
note that Rhea carried forty-four counties with a Negro 
population of less than five per cent as compared to 
Chandler's twenty-two counties. 69 Rhea's larger ntunber 
was principally due to the fact that many of the counties 
68The Underwood Collection contains a number o£ the 
publications of the Kentucky Retail Merchants Association 
entitled The KentUCKY Merchant. 
69U. S. Census Bureau, 1940 Census; Population 
Characteristics (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
19h.S), I, pp. 211-34. 
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with STIllll Negro populations are located in Eastern 
Kentucky. When a comparison is made of the counties with 
Negro population above five per cent Q mere ~ven distribu-
tion iE, found. Of these counties, ChandlEJr carried 
twenty-five and Rhea seventeen. 70 Thus, it does not appear 
that a large Neg~o vote was given to either candidate. 
There were many reasons for tue large voter turnout 
in the 1935 election, just as there were many factors 
affecting the outcome of the election. The sales tax was 
of great importance because of the popular opposition to 
it. This issue was probably most decisive in Northern and 
Central Kentucky and Jefferson County, where it was most 
unpopular. This factor, of cOl~se, enhanced Chandler's 
vote. However, the sales tax issue was not the only fac-
tor responsible for the heavy voter participation. This 
is indicated by the record-breaking vote given to Rhea, who 
was generally credited with the passage of the tax measure. 
A part of Rhea's vote can be attributed to the administra-
tion's control of patronage. At a time when jobs were at 
a minimum, many individuals on the state's payroll probably 
feared a Rhea defeat and thus turned out in large numbers 
at the polls. 
Another factor not to be dismissed was the excitement 
generated by the fervor and controversy caused by the split 
within the Democratic Party. This extreme factionalism 




on behalf of both of the major candidates. 
One newspaper asserted that tlw unusually large vote 
"was dependent largely upon the 'silent vote' which often 
forgets about election day, or is kept from the polls by 
inolement weather."71 The "silent vote" turned out in 
1935, the paper indicated because of "some heated state 
senatorial cleotions."72 Although this analysis excludes 
factors of greater importanoe .. suoh as the flales tax, it 
does point out one element. Certainly, interest in looal 
elections served to inorease the interest and vote in the 
primary. However, this faotor was of less significanoe 
than that of the sales tax or factionalism. 
No gubernatorial oandidate in the August priIT~ry 
received a majority of tl~ votes. Under the provisions of 
the compulsory primary law of 1935 .. the two oandidates 
reoe! ving the largest number of votes were required to 
contest eaoh other for the nomination in a run-oft primary 
eleotion on the first Saturday in September. This, of 
course, meant that Rhea and Chandler would have to do 
battle again for the nomination. Although the other three 
oandidates had been eliminated, their vote assumed great 
importance for both of the major candidates. Combined, 
the vote ot \.Iootton, Huddleston, and \<falli8 constituted 
only 12.7 per oent of the total vote, but if added to 
either Rhea's 45.1 per oent or Chandler's 42.1 per cent of 
71u.erald Post, August 9, 1935, p. 7. 
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the vote, it would give him the nomination. 
Chandler and Rhea were not the only candidates forced 
into a run-off primary. Only two candidates, and they 
were both on Rhea's slate, received the Democratio nomina-
tion in the first primary. They were Garth K. Ferguson 
who was nominated for Commissioner of Agriculture and 
Harry vJ. Peters who received the nomination for Superin-
tendent of Public Instruction. None of the other candi-
dates on Rhea's or Chandler's slate secured a majority of 
tile votes. Rhea's candidate for lieutenant governor, Keen 
Johnson, had 119,058 votes while J. L. W1se, who ran on 
Chandler's slate and received 59,655 votes. 73 The impor-
tance of Louisville's vote is demonstrated by the fact 
that three of the candidates on Rhea's ticket and three on 
Chandler's ticket were from Louisville. On hhea1s ticket 
these included C. 1'. Arnett, who sought the nomination of 
Secretary of State, Sarah W. Mahan who ran for State 
Treasurer and R. H. Kirchdorfer who sought the nomination 
for Clerk of the Court of Appeals. Those from Louisville 
on Chandler's ticket were Naja Eudley who campaigned for 
the nomination of Secretary of state, J. E. Breckingham 
who ran for state Treasurer and his candidate for Clerk of 
the Court of Appeals, W. B. O'Connell. The rest of 
73courier-Journa1, August 13, 1935, p. 2. '!he other 
candidates for lieutenant governor and their votes were: 
R. F. Wright, 36,520: J. T. t-~urphy, 19,899; fI. O. Smith, 
17,622; Munnell Wilson, l2,h2l; T. B. Roberts, 10,639; 
T. C. l'Jright, lO,S16; and Ed Vanover J-1-,209. 
Chandlcx"s slate l,olas::rlade up of I. A. Logan, no~ninee for 
stat\,'; ~wdit':)r and,. 'j .• Vincent 'Who sought t~le attorney 
general's nO f '1.ination. Rhea's candidates I'DI' tt;,ese two 
offl ce s ware -,. i • Shs!l~lon and F'. y;. bur t.:6. 
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Ox::.~e the retlU'ns of t~le pri:nsr:; were official all of 
t:-lese carlrlida:;es started carnpal;:;ning a;;a~n. After in-
numerable Bpeec:;'6s and rallies the voters would once a~;ain 
be '~iven an opportunity to chose their gubernatorial 
candidatE) • 
CHAPTER IV 
THE Rmr.OFF PRIl-lARY 
Little time elapsed after the August primary before 
both the gubernatorial candidates were campaigning again. 
Chandler was the first of the two candidates to start the 
run-off contest. Commenting on the first primary, on 
August 7, he said: 
Rhea's machine has hit a stone wall and 
finished its course. The result of the 
primar:l has forcefully and clearly 
demonstrated that a majori ty of L,emo-
cratic voters in Kentucky cannot be 
browbeaten or intimidated by any machine 
or purchased by any amount of money.l 
Unlike Chandler, Rhea's initial move in the campaign was 
marked by a desire to slow the pace of the campaign. In a 
somewhat surprising step, on August 8, Rhea proposed that 
Chandler and he discontinue all political discussion during 
the ltleeks before the run-off primary. Arguing that the 
"voters were suffiCiently advised about the positions of 
the two candidates to vote intelligently," Rhea stated that 
bj' such an agreement he hoped "to allay the political fires 
so the party would be in a better shape for the November 
election."2 Refusing to agree to such an arrangement, 
Chandler described Rhea's proposal as a desire tor an 
lLexington Leader, August 8, 1935, p. 1. 
2Courier-Journal, August 9, 1935, p. 1. 
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armistice in liGht of certain defeat.) 
Although Rhea had on rnany occasions expressed, both 
privately and publicly, concern tor the party's well being, 
Chandler's ~eaction contained an element of truth. Con-
tidence among Democrats in the Rhea organization was shaken 
by the loss of traditional administration strongholds such 
as Northern Kentucky.4 Many politicians began to doubt 
that Rhea could defeat Chandler's rising popularity and to 
t' question Rhea's reputation as a master-mind in politics.~ 
Twice Rhea had made serious misoalculations which were 
having disastrous etfects on his bid for governor. Twice 
in 1935, he had the no~atlon in the pa~ of his hand and 
through errors in judgment lost it. The first mistake 
occurred when the popular demand for a primary arose. In 
January, 1935, Rhea had written a friend that either a 
primary or a convention would suit him. 6 If this was true, 
it would have been far wiser for him to have worked for a 
primary. Instead, he and Laffoon, ignoring public senti-
n~nt, persuaded the Executive Committee to call for a 
convention, thereby, seemingly assuring hhea of the nom-
ination. The nomination which was his was then lost when 
Governor Laffoon and he journeyed to Washington. Then, 
within a week, Rhea, by endorsing the run-off primary 
3Henderson }1orning Gleaner, August 10, 1935, p. 6. 
4Courier-Journal, August 11, 1935, p. 10. 
5Ibid. 
-
6Thomas S. Rhea to Urey Woodson, January 21, 1935, 
Woodson Papers. 
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bill, made what woul6 become a dIsastrous mistake. The 
run-off primary law gave Chandler another month in which 
to perfect an or~sanization and carry his campaign to the 
people. In his call for an end to political campaigning, 
Rhea sought to minimize the advantages he had given 
Chandler. 
After the August primary Rhea and Chandler immediately 
tried to obtain the en~orsements of the three minor candi-
dates. The most important of these was Wallis who had 
polled over 38,000 votes. Commenting on this subject one 
paper si,ated: "Conceding for the sake of argument, that 
both Rhea and Chandler, polled their top strength. . ., 
the one that receives the Wallis-Klair vote in September 
will have a majority.«7 Much of Wallis' support had come 
from the Billy Klair organization in Lexington. Taus this 
mants influence had great bearing on Wallis' decision. 
Klair had disagreed with the Laffoon administration over 
the removal of highway commissioner Charles Fennell of 
Lexington and many persons expected n.1m to support Chand-
ler.a On August 15, 1935, Wallis announced that he would 
support Chandler. He stated that he believed that the 
lieutenant governor I·would be thousands of votes stronger 
than Thomas S. Rhea in the November election.,,9 Five days 
7The Corbin Times, August 10, 1935, p. 1. 
8Ibld • 
<tSenderson Morning Gleaner, Au:::~ust 16, 1935, p. 7. 
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10 later, Billy Klair endorsed Chandler's candidacy. Rhea 
reacted to Wallis' decision by charging that Chandler had 
bargained with v:allis for his sUP.Jort. v1811is denied 
these assertions and stated that the reason he was endors-
ing the election of Chandler was because "Chandler is 
running on the same platform that I campaigned on preced-
ing the August primary."ll 
While Chandler received the endorsement of Wallis, 
Huddleston's support was given to Rhea. Huddleston's 
decision was made, he stated with: 
The conviction that his Rhea's plat-
form will serve the people of Kentucky 
to a greater advantage than that of his 
opponent • • •• It is my belief that 
Kentucky will be served more advantage-
ously t,hrough Mr. Rhea due to his age, 
experience and knowledge of governmental 
affairs.. • .12 
In their campaign addresses, both Chandler and Rhea 
dealt Dgain with those questions which had charaoterized 
the first primary. But these were overshadowed by two new 
issues which developed out of the voting in the first 
primary. They were ooncerned with the use of National 
Guardsmen at the polls in Harlan County and the abnormal 
vote In'Lo~an County. both issues were beneficial to 
Chandler's candidacy. 
Harlan County, loeated in the extreme southeastern 
lOHarlan Laily Enterprise, August 21, 1935, p. 1. 
lll£!£., August 16, 1935, p. 1. 
12Lexington Herald, August 19, 1935, p. 2. 
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corner of the state, in the Jonths preceding the election, 
had been the scene of numerous incidents of violence. 
These incidents accompanied the attempts of the United 
Mine Workers' to unionize the coal fields of Eastern 
Kentucky. To aid local officials in maintaininz order, the 
governor, in early July, had sent Guardsmen to coal com-
panies in Harlan County which had experienced disturbances. 
These incidents and a previous record of fraudulent elec-
tions were used by the Laffoon administration as justifica-
tion for sending seven hundred troops, under the command 
of Adjutant General Lenhardt, to Harlan County for the 
purpose ot supervising the voting in its seventy-one pre-
cincts. l ) 
The tact that the troops had been dispatched un-
announced the evening before the election aroused wide-
spread crt tic ism. In the days immt3diately prior to the 
election, rumors that Guardsmen were goinG to be sent to 
the area had been current tllroughout the state. 'VJhen ques-
tioned about these rumors, members of tl~ Latfoon adminis-
tration denied them. However, tLle effectiveness with which 
the troops were deployed indicated that the operation had 
been thoroughly thought--out and well-prepared. The Harlan 
Daily Enterprise noted that: 
Every officer in command of the group at 
each polling place carried large blue 
print maps of Harlan, probably forty 
inches square. On this map the final 
l)The Corbin Times, August ), 1935, p. 1. 
precinct destination of each p~oup with I 
the roads leading there, was marked off.l+ 
In addition, each officer was equipped with the pamphlet 
98 
siened by the Honest Election League of Harlan County, 
"which was in fact a set of instructions for the sol-
diers. hlS Among other things the pamphlet instructed the 
soldiers to examine all ballot boxes before the polls 
opened. These pamphlets were distributed to the officers 
16 before they reached Harlan. 
The action of the administration was discredited by 
the conduct of Adjutant General Lenhardt. After learning 
of the movement of troops into the county, Harlan officials 
obtained a court injunction forbidding the use of them. 
Attempts to serve the injunction on Denhardt proved futile 
until late in the day and then Denhardt ignored it. The 
situation was made worse when the executive order of the 
governor authorizing the use of the troops could not be 
located until after the election weekend.17 
An investigation by an irate Harlan County l~and jury 
in late August disclosed that some of the officers sent to 
the area had interfered with the voting. "The movement of 
14Harlan Daily Enterprise, August 4, 1935, p. 2. 
15~. 
16Ibid. 
17r.uring this period Laffoon was in a Lexington hos-
pital recovering from an appendectomy. He insisted that 
he had signed an executive order, but a twenty-four hour 
search for it in Frankfort failed to uncover it. Courier-
Journal, August 3, 1935, p. 1. 
these soldiers, It the report of the grand jury declared: 
Was an invasion • • •• The mobilization 
of these men and their movement into the 
county was carried out with all the care, 
secrecy find completeness of an arI"!y meet-
L11.g 8. national foe instead of ~ c iviliaD 
population in bed and asleep.l~ 
The report further charged that Laffoon "by holding the 
order until after the soldiers were in Harlan COIDIty and 
the election over, made himself a party to a movement 
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designed for only one purpose and that to coerce and in-
terfere vJith and intimidate the voters of Harlan County."19 
The grand jury issued a warrant for Lenhardt after he 
refused to appear be1'ore the grand jury t s hearings. He 
was cl~rged with criminal contempt of restraining order. 
To avoid arrest he remained in hiding for several weeks. 
This sort of behavior from a public official was subject 
to serious condemnation. Rhea's candidacy was somewhat 
tarnished by the fact that tenhardt had been one of Rhea's 
most active supporters, making numerous speeches on his 
behalf. 
The Laffoon administration's justification in sending 
the National Guardsmen to Harlan is not being questioned. 
Nor is the validity of the grand Jury's findings being 
questioned. vlhat is pertinent to this study is that the 
manner in which the troops were dispatched, the actions of 
Denhardt, and the lvidespread public i ty 1-1:b..ich the report of 
l8Harlan raily Enterprise" AUi~ust 24, 1935, p. 1. 
19l!?!9.. 
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the grand jur~' received all provid8c Chandler l.>d th effec-
tive campaign issues. 
Chandler strucK hard and often at this l;:-sue. In his 
opening address, he described the Harlan situation as ttan 
effort to establish a 'Huey Long' dictatorship over 
Kentucky, tt and declared tha.t uove1"noz' LaffoD..VJ. and Rhea were 
using "H~nry 'Hitler' Lenhardt to establish their dictator-
shlp."20 
On this matter', Rhea assumed a defensive position, 
!M.:tntaining that the troops had been sent into Harlan "to 
prevent the most unscrupulcus election i'rauC! ever per-
petrated in the state." 2l He stated that "the soldiers 
were sent to Harlan County 'lrJithout my request, consent or 
knowledge, • • • but the record looks like anybody "Jould 
have been fully justified in sending them up there."22 
Rhea was speaking not only of Harlan's previous election 
record but also of the voting in the 1935 prImary. In many 
of his speeches, he stressed this by singling out the 
voting behavior in the Three Point precinct of Harlan 
County. "The soldiers didn t t get there until eight 0' clock 
election morning," Rhea stated, but by that time there had 
"been cast already four hundred and thirty-seven vctes. 
From eir~t to four, when the polls closed, only eight more 
20Lexington Leader# August 17, 1935, p. 1. 
211Iarlan Laily Enterprise, August 23, 1935, p. 1. 
22Courler-Journal, August 25, 1935, p. 1. 
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votes were cast."23 
Another issue which arose out of the August primary 
was that of the unusual vote in Rhea's horne county, Logarl. 
Although the total vote of 10,903 did not exceed the 
county's potential vote of 13 ,38L~, Rhea received the 
largest vote ever given any candidate in the county.24 Up 
to 1935, the largest vote ever cast in the county had been 
given to Franklin L. Roosevelt in 1932. when he received 
7,072 votes. Furthermore, the vote in Logan County sur-
passed the vote in counties with populations three times 
that of Logan's. Taking note of these facts and keeping 
the~ before the public eye, Chandler and newspapers around 
the state raised the outcry of election fraud. Rhea 
responded to these accusations by declaring that he was 
"proud of the vote given in Lor,an county. n25 He accused 
the Courier-Journal of trying to make his victory in the 
county appear "as everything under the sun but what it was 
-- a tribute to me and my policies and my platform."26 
Rhea's contention that the Courier-Journal sought to 
discredit him was undoubtedly correct. But he failed to 
note that others were also denouncine the vote in Logan 
County. One paper sarcastically remarked that: 
23Herald Post, August 25, 1935, p. 1. 
24shannon and McQuown, Presidential Politics, p. 117. 
Rhea received 10,171 votes in Logan County. Jewell, 
Kentucky Votes, II, 15. 
25Courier-Journal, August 24, 1935. p. 3. 
26~. 
Only the comparatively small population 
of his native Logan County would seem 
to have presented Tho:m.as S. Rhea from 
securing B majority Bnd winning the 
nomination for Governor in the August 
prilmr:t. 27 
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No evidence has been discovered to sUbstantiate the oharges 
of fraud in the Logan County election. Certainly the fact 
that Rhea was from the county and was popular there cannot 
be disoounted as a factor in the increase in voting. In 
many elections, candidates for high office receive a large 
majority in their home districts. Chandler, in his home 
county of Woodford, received seventy-four per cent of the 
vote in the Augus t pI'imary. Of course, there was a s ub-
stantial difference between Chandler's percentage and the 
ninety-one per cent Rhea received. 
The questionable Logan County vote and the pres6nce of 
troops in Harlan County provided the oandidates with new 
issues which helped to sustain voter interest. But the old 
issues, particularly the sales tax, retained its importance 
1n the run-off campaign. Chandler's opposition to the un-
popular tax and his pledge to repeal it stood, in the eyes 
of many voters, in startling contrast to Hhea' s defense of 
it. Chandler's stand on the sales tax is considered by 
many to be the I'6ason for his victory over Hhea. 28 Cer-
tainly this was the most important factor in his successful 
27Harlan Daily Enterprise, August 8, 1935, p. 2. 
28Allan Trout, Elam Huddleston, and Clay W. bailey all 
state that it was the issue of the sales tax wrlich defeated 
Rhea and assured Chandler his victory. 
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bid for the nomination. It earned him the support of 
numerous m:H1spapers, the Rt tail Mero:t!.ants Assoc iation t and 
muoh of the genoral public. 
The sales tax controversy combined with the public 
acclaim Chf:lndler received in oalling the spE':'cial session of 
the General Assembly enabled Chandler to compete success-
fully w:J. th Rhea \Olho possessed the resources of the admin-
istration. In addition to the assistance of the state 
machinery, Rhea had built up an organization composed of 
many county officials. Rhea was not a man who had a great 
deal of popular appeal. Consequently, he relied upon the 
assistance of a power.ful network of local politic ians ieJhich 
stretched from county court house to county court house.29 
This type of behind-the-scenes organization was largely a 
product of Rheatg vast experience as a political organizer. 
Rhea also received the support of the liquor interests 
in the state. Many distillers feared that if the sales tax 
~:as eliminated, the state vJould increase t~Le tax on 
liquor. 30 In fact, many in the state legislature had urged 
this t;ype of revenue measure in place of the sales tax. 
Chandler's campaign was not lacking organizational 
support. He had in Lian Talbot, his campaign manae€r, one 
of the most brilliant political organizers in Aentucky.3l 
29Interviews with Trout and Huddleston. 
30urey \yoodson to Colonel Hartfield, August 26, 1935, 
Wood son Papers. 
31Interview with Allan Trout. 
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It was Talbot who hac Engineered Laffoon t s norllinat ion and 
election in 1931. The same skill which he employed in 1931 
to carry Laffoon to the governor's chair was used in 1935 
to defeat the candida te supported by Laffoon. Starting 
soon after Chandler announced his oandidacy, Talbot visited 
many counties, contacting men and women who could lead 
Chandler's campaign in local areas. 32 Although he was not 
able to set up organizations in each county by August, he 
had, by the time of the run-otf primary, es tabU shed a 
Chandler group in each of the one hundred twenty counties 
in the state. The majority of the workers in Talbot's 
organization were young and politically inexperienced, for 
most of the veteran workers had aligned themselves with 
Rhea.33 This had proved an asset to Rhea in the first 
primary. However, at the same time Talbot's men had 
gained valuable training in the August primary and were 
able to render Chandler more assistance in the run-off 
contest. Furthermore, the inexperience of many of Chand-
ler's workers was offset by the advantage he co~nanded 
through his stand on the sales tax and prim.ary issues. 
In run-orf campaign both candidates demonstrated an 
increased interest in labor's vote. On one occasion Hhea 
recalled that he always supported labor and pledged his 
continued support to the laboring men and women. 34 He 
32Couri~r-Journal, November 10, 1935, p. 12. 
33baylor, ken Talbot, p. 325. 
34The Sun Democrat, September 3, 1935, clipping in 
Swope Scrapbooks. 
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further pledged that "if the scales of justice between 
capital and labor are unbalanced, I will do my utmost to 
balance them when I become Governor."3S ChancIer made sim-
ilar appeals but placed greater stress on his own experi-
enoe as a laborer • .36 l,espite the inoreased concern of the 
oandidates, org~lized labor still did not endorse either 
man. 
After tne August primary, many of Rhea's supporters 
had confidently predicted that the turn-out for the run-
off primary would be muoh smaller than that of the August 
eleotion. However, the size of the crowds wClich attended 
the candidates' appearanoes tended to discredit the idea 
that interest in the nomination was diminishing after the 
first primary. The record-breaking attendances at polit-
ical meetings were explained by the Rhea forces as curi-
osity and by the Chandler forces as a sign of victory. The 
explanation of the latter group would prove to be more 
valid. 
Despite the predictions of the Rhea forces, almost 
forty-five thousand more I:emocrats voted in September 
primary than had voted in the first primary. Combined, the 
vote of the two oandidates totaled 494,697. 37 Chandler, 
reoeiving 260,$73 votes, increased his August vote by some 
80,998 votes. On the other hand, Rhea eained only 31,114 
3$~. 
36courier-Journal, August 31, 1935, p. 2. 
37Jewel1, Kentucky Votes, II, 17. 
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votes, finishing with a total of 234,121.,..38 
Chandler made fewest gains in votes in Eastern Ken-
tucky which remained staunchly pro-Rhea. However, he did 
pick up Knott, Lee and Powell counties. In the Bluegrass 
region, he made sUbstantial gains. From Rhea he picked up 
Clark and Robertson counties and from the other three 
candidates he took Fayette, !-1adison and Bourbon counties. 
His greate st 1~a1ns came in the Owensboro-Henderson and 
Jackson Purchase areas. By slim margins, Union, McLean and 
r,aviess counties aligned theInBelves for the first time with 
Chandler. 39 In the Jackson Purchase region, he took Cal-
loway County from Rhea and picked up McCracken and Marshall 
counties which had been carried earlier by the three minor 
candidates. A factor in Chandler increase in this region 
was the Wallis vote which had been strongest in the Jack-
son Purchase area. Chandler also made inroads into Rhea's 
home territory, carrying Caldwell, Christian, Simpson and 
Barren counties. Other counties gained by Chandler 
included Clinton, Pulaski, and Gallatin counties. In all, 
Chandler carried fourteen counties which had been carried 
b~ Phea in the August primary. Of trds number, eleven 
were carried by Chandler with less than a 16% increase in 
his vote. Thus, many of the counties gained by Chandler 
had given him SUbstantial votes in the first primary. 




persisted in the run-off prims.'ry. Of those counties with 
property values from one to twenty dollars per acre, 
Chandler carried eighteen and Rh€o8 thirty-five. 40 There 
were thirty-nine counties with property values ranging frorri 
twenty to forty dollars per acre. or this number, Chandler 
carried twenty-eight and Rhea eleven. 'l'he division becomes 
more marked in those counties with property values over 
forty dollars. Raee carried two of these counties and 
Chandler twenty-six. Chandlerts increase in the number of 
wealthy counties was due to his gains in the rich Bluegrass 
region. 
The Negro voting in the run-orf primary changed some-
what from that of the first primary. Counties with small 
Negro population were fairly evenly divided between the two 
candidates. For instance, of those with a Negro population 
of under six per cent, Fhea carried thirty-five and Chand-
ler thirty-three.41 Rhea carried ten oounties with Negro 
population of from six to fifteen per cent, while Chandler 
oarried thirty-two. Of the counties with Negro populatio!ls 
of over fifteen per cent, five were cs.rried by Chandler and 
three by Rhea. Thus, again Chandler took a greater per-
centage of those counties with the largest Negro popula-
tion. Most of these counties are located in the ~Jestern 
Kentucky, and in the Louisville and Bluef~ass regions. 
f1uoh of Chandler strenr;th was ooncentrated in these areas, 
'-l.Or. s. C(~nsus Bureau, 191+° Census, Asriculture, I, 
16-25. 
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and the r;'ep'o vote must have contributeo to this. However, 
as in the eaX':l..ier priml:l.l'Y call1paign, no app6ul was made 
dire ctl~ on racial e;;l'ounds. l',ol'e import.ant WflS the ffict 
ths.t ',:estern l(entucky had been the r ... otbed of anti-adminis-
trat::tOIl sentiment. F'urthermvre, opposition to the sales 
tax was strong in the Bluegrass region and it was Chand-
leI" s home. 
After more than six months of intensive campaigning 
b7, candidates, the LeIilocra tic Part J' :aac finally ehos en its 
gubernatorial nominee. Th£> rest of Chancle.r ' s ticket ws.S 
also nominated, except for J. r:. \"11se, t he candidate for 
lieutenant Eovernor. Although Rhea lost the election, h.is 
running mate, Keen J'ohnson, received the nomination for 
lieutenant governor.42 Johllson avoided as much as pc.ssible 
the intra-party fi~hting. In addition, he. had built a 
powerful political organization in the central part of the 
state wl:lich aided him tremendously. Furthermore, Johnson 
r~Q a Great deal of support in Louisville. 
The results of the run-off election signaled tfle end 
of t~o carecr of a man W:-10 had loni:~ l)een a po'Werful fL:ure 
in Kentucky politics. For the other candidate the victory 
signaled the ascenda"-lcy of onc of th.e most oolorful and 
skillful politicians in the state's l'listor~. 
Chandler's victory cannot be eXplained solel:1 in terms 
of the controversy over the sales tax and the direct 
1.j.2Manuscript records of elections, Off!ce of Secretary 
of state, Frankfort, Kentucky. Johnson received 186,898 
votes and ~lse 1$6,549 votes. 
110 
primary. Just as important in his victory was his person-
ality and character. Chandler represented the new tJPe or 
leader w:1.ich emerged during the trying 1930' s .1+3 These new 
leaders contrasted sharply with the old-type leadership, "a 
type 'ithich arose after the Civ1l v!ar and dominated Kentucky 
poli tics for half a century. "114 This type has been called 
the "orator1oal sohool of politioal leadership."45 As a 
member of this sohool, Rhea was often given to the 
"eloquent phrases and perfume soented ora tory. n46 
The new type of leadership arose with issues and prob-
lems never before faoed by Amerlcans. These problems, for 
the most part, were woven around economic and soclal con-
ditions such as unemployment, care for the aged and af~l-
cultural relief. Representative of this type, Chandler 
spoke in a "dynamio and hard-hitting, wise-cracking, non-
florid" manner which was popular with many people. L~ 7 
In addition, to the popularity of his political ideas 
and the courage of his speech and actions, on the rostrum 
he appeared an earnest and understanding person, and one 
whose energy and strength could solve many problems. 48 
Besides these qualitles, Chandler possessed a pleasing 
43Interviews with Bailey I, and Trout. 




48Intervlew with Bailey, I. 
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personalitJ'; one W!llcl1 lIe;xuded a vJealbl of' genlalitJ and 
good feeling in his personal contacts with the voters.n49 
Chandler's congenial pSl'sonality and ready smile w(~re 
the source of much criticism by .his opponents. For example, 
one paper described ~im as: 
A rollicking, personally likable young 
man, a good mixer and entertainer of the 
"hailfellow well mett! variet~'. Mr. 
Chandler perhaps would have found greater 
success in the role of public entertainer 
than in politics. He has undoubtedly 
strong appeal to the good will of a large 
following who do not trouble to look 
underneath the surface froth.SO 
respite the sentiments of that paper, a majority of Iemo-
cratic voters demonstra,ted the belief that they had seen 
"beneath the froth" an ability greater than that possessed 
.' by the other candidates. Before final victor:t was achi0ved J 
this ability would be demonstrated again. 
1-l-9Jiamilton Tapp and Frederick A. Wallis, A Sesgui-
Centsruliul History of Kentuoky (Hopkinsville: Historical 
Record Association, 1945), II, p. 749. 
SOThe Glasgow Republioan, october 31, l03S, clipping 
in Swope Scrapbooks. 
CHAPTEH V 
THh. GlJBLRNATOHIAL CAfWAIGN 
l.Jhile the Democrats were engaged in the run-off cam-
paign, the Republican candidate had remained relatively 
quiet. Many Republicans believed that if Swope were not 
active, the factionalism in the J)emocratlc Party would be 
intensified. Some Republicans contended that the bitter-
ness which characterized the Rhea-Chandler contest would 
prevent the winner from receiving the full support of Lemo-
cratic voters in November. As early as July 10, one 
Republioan newspaper had remarked: 
rlhioh ever way the Democratic nomination 
goes, it seems likely that the winner 
will be unable to command the entire sup-
port of the lemocratic voters. At least 
a partial split in the Democratic Party 
appears almost inevitable considering the 
steadily growing heat of the gubernatorial 
campaigns of the candidates • • • • Judge 
Swope and the entire Republican ticket 
cannot but profit from the internal strife 
which seems likely to develop in the 
l~emocratic Party.l 
Other Republicans, wedle recognizing that some defec-
tion might result from the fighting in the I;emocratic 
Party, argued that the intense nature of the Lemocratic 
contest was generating interest among people who generally 
did not vote. This increased interest, it was feared, 




would produce a large temoc:ratlc vote. One Hepublican 
paper went so far as to decry the fact that the Republican 
ca.mpaign was developing with "less noise i·md recrimination 
than characterized the Lemocratic part;;."2 
Beforo and after the run-off primar~:, Swope criticized 
severel;y the factionalism wi thin the l'emocratic Party. 
ttLashed by the scorpion of factionalsirn and stung by the 
addf'r of partisanship," the Republican candidate stated 
trl8.t n :~entucky presents a pitiful and appalling picture of 
political servitude and degradation. lt3 In rilost of his 
speeches, Swope made it clear that in his opinion little 
difference existed between the two factions. He argued 
t~ they were both corrupt and both determined to dominate 
state politics. 
The F.epublicen candidate c!id more than cri ticize the 
strife wi tnin the opposing party. In the opening address of 
his gubernatorial campaign, Swope announced his platform.4 
Concerned about education in the state, Swope pledged to 
expand the free textbook program and the entire educational 
system. On the financial side, he promised to reduce the 
state debt by discontinu1ng the 1ssuance of interest bear-
ing warrants, assess property owners every two years instead 
of annuall~, and oppose the re-enactment of the sales tax. 
2Central Record, Jul;, 11, 1935, clipping in Sl"ope 
Scrapbooks. 
3IIarlan 1ai1y Enterprl.se, September 26, 1935, p. 1. 
l~kexln[rton Heruld, September 22, 1935, p. 1. 
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He further stated that he would remove the spoils system 
from the state's charity and correctional institutions. 
Finally, lie said that if elected he would call for a 
constitutional change which would permit counties to con-
sollfate and city and oounty governments to merge.' 
Opening his campaign seven days after Swope, Chandler 
charged that the Republican candidate had adopted most of 
his platform. Only on two points, Cdandler alleged, was 
there any disagreement, and he continually emphasized these 
differences. The Lemocratic nominee asserted that he and 
Swope differed on the primary question, implying that Swope 
had indicated a preferenoe for the convention system. 
Aotually Swope had only exprE seed opposition to run-off 
primaries. 
The other area of major disagreement in the platforms 
of the two candidates became one of the principal issues in 
the gubernatorial oampaign. In his opening speech, Swope 
hRd stated: !lIf elected I will appoint a non-political 
highway conmission.,,6 In later addresses, SWOpE: extended 
the pledge of non-political rule to other areas of the 
state government. Chandler l!Dl.'ll8diately aooused Swope of 
returning the state to bi-partisan rule. Itrontt let Swope 
tell you," asserted Chandler, "there is any such tiling as a 
5Copy of Republican platform 1935: Kin Swope Col-
lection, Archives Llvision, Margaret I. King Library, 
Lniversi ty of .iCentl:oky. 
6Lexington Herald, September 22, 1935, p. 1. 
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non-partisan party in Kentucky."7 Chandler compared 
Swope t s pledge of a non-political government to the type of 
bi-pat'tisan ';overnment which had dom.1r18.teo the state before 
the election of Laf'f'oon, and charged the.t the group wt1ich 
had forrooc the C~-mbine was bacl{ir:g Swcpe. 8 Chandler's as-
s6rtions 'Here not completely acourate as many of his own 
supporters, such as Ben Johnson and Billy Y..lair, had been 
lea~ers in the Bi-Partisan Combine. 
'l'he ['emocratic candlde.te elso charged that Swope' s 
promise of a non-political administration was fostered by a 
"bargain" with Rhea and his supporters. He declared that 
Swope hau "traded Republicans out of' his bi-partisanship 
• • • and betrayed them by promising the jobs to the bi-
partisan combine. n9 Swope consistently denied these accu-
sations, statinG that he sought 10 his advocacy of non-
political management of' the state, not bi-partisan govern-
ment, but a more efficient and less costly government. 
This would be achieved through the appointment of tt men who 
are outstanding in their qualifications • • ,,10 • • 
fJespite denials by Swope, later events seemed to vin-
dicate Chandler's charges that some sort of political 
agree~~nt had been made with the Rhea forces. The results 
7Courier-Journal, October 19, 1935, p. 2. 
8l£!£., October 20, 1935, p. 12. 
9Morehead Independent, October 10, 1935, clipping in 
Swope Scrapbooks. 
10Courier-Journal, September 22, 1935, p. 1. 
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of the run-off primar;y had hardly been annolIDced when 
political observers began to project a "party bolt" by the 
Rhea forces. This speculation was given credence by sev-
eral incidents. The first occurred when Rhea failed to 
congratulate Chandler on his victory in the run-off primary. 
Then on September 12, lengthy conferences were held by 
Governor Laffoon, Thomas Rhea, Keen Johnson, and Earle 
Clements, .. heals campaign manager. ll From these confer-
ences there emerged rumors and reports of a possible bolt. 
Finally, speculation was aroused by Laffoon's and Rhea's 
conspicious absence from Chandler's opening rally. 
The threat of a party bolt was given a great deal of 
attention. in spite of repeated assertions of party loyalty 
made by Rhea during the two primary campaigns. In the 
closinh days of the run-off campaign, Rhea had declared: 
I told you in my opening speech, June 8 
at Bowling Green, that I would do nothing 
in this campaign to hurt my party in 
November •••• I have not changed from 
that day to this. I love my party more 
than the office I seek. And, if you 
should make the mistake of nominating my 
opponent I will be out there fighting for 
him in November just like I fought for 
forty yea1's. 12 
Evidence of a possible bolt accumulated during Sep-
tember, but Hhea and Laffoon refused to comment on the 
subject. Then on October 7, a dinner was given in Louis-
ville in Rhea t s honor. Present at the dinner were rnnny 
IlHarlan Daily Enterprise, September 12, 1935, p. 1. 
12.!..P..!2.., September 1, 1935, p. 11-. 
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state officials, some of whom were wearing Swope buttons. 13 
Needless to say, this increased the speculation. 
Eleven days after the dinner in Louisville, the 
governor delivered a speech in Northern Kentucky, in whioh 
he sl~rply assailed Chandler's candidaoy, and expressed the 
hope that the people of Kentucky "would not be fooled by 
the 'olap-trap' of Chandler and his supporters.,,14 In this 
speech, Laffoon gave public notice of his opposition to 
Chandler's candidacy, but he did not endorse the oandidacy 
of the Republican nominee. In a move that surprised few, 
Laffoon announced in a speech at Prestonburg on October 29, 
that he would vote for the entire Democratic ticket except 
Chandler. Laffoon defended his aotion by declaring: 
When a Democrat tries to wreck a 
lJemocratic administration he is not 
entitled to support. Mr. Chandler 
and his gang have done all they 
could against my administration. 
F'or that reason I am not going to 
support Mr. Chandler.1S 
Rhea went a step further than the Governor. In a 
radio address, on the day before the general eleotion, Lhea 
repudiated his primary pledge to support the Democratic 
nominee and endorsed King Swope1s candidacy. Rhea denied 
that he had been motivated by any sort of political deal 
with the Republican nominee. Speaking of his pledge to 
support the part~ nominee and the reasons for his action, 
13courier-Journal, October E, 1935, p. 1. 
14Cincinnati Enquirer, October 19, 1935, p. 1. 
lSLex1ngton Herald, October 30, 1935, p. 1. 
he statecl: 
This promise was not made beoause of 
any belief in the platform of the 
present nominee, but because of my 
belief in the principles of the Demo-
cratic Party. This promise was mede 
in good faith and without knowledge 
of some tactics my opponent employed 
in the second primary, whioh are 
obnoxious to any man, and wholly in-
exousable. His tactios and conduot 
are not such that his election would 
be a Demooratic victory; but it would 
have be~n such as would discredit any 
party.lo 
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Rhea did not elaborate upon the prinCiples he believed tl~t 
Chandler had affronted nor did he explain completely what 
tactics he had used. Some vague references were made by 
Rhea to the effect that the Chandler organization had in 
some way mistreated his family, but he refused to explain 
in what manner this ocourred. Rhea did speoifically accuse 
Chandler of oirculating, in Catholic communities, a state-
ment which pointed out that Ben Johnson, Dan Talbot, Percy 
Haly, and Billy Klair were all Catholics. The circular, 
Rhea said, ended with the question: "\{hat chance have the 
Protestants to get recognition with this line_up?1t17 Suoh 
statements he asserted had cost him many Catholic votes. 
Without referring to Rhea by name, Chandler denounced the 
injection of the religious issue as being ttbeneath the 
dignity of an answer. n18 
l6Courier-Journal, November 5, 1935, p. 1. 
l7Cincinnati Enquirer, November S, 1935, p. 1. 
l8Cour ier-Journal, November 5, 1935, p. 1. 
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On the basis of the evidence available at tlus time, 
it is impossible to state positively whether a mutually 
beneficial agreement had been arranged between Rhea and the 
Republican candidate. This type of alliance was not un-
common in Kentucky's history and it is very possible that 
such an agreement was made between Rhea and Swope .19 Al-
though no evidence has been unCOvered to 1mplicate either 
person, Swope did receive the aid of some of Rhea's organ-
ization. In a letter written to Swope's wife on October 
I 15, 1935, the fact is disclosed that Earle Clements, "hea s 
campaign manager, was actively assisting the Swope campaign 
in Clements' home distriot. 20 It seems highly improbable 
that Rhea was not at least aware of this assistance, and 
that he did not give at least an indirect nod of assent. 
Ho\-,!ever, none of this is oonolusive proof that an agree-
ment was made between the Republican candidate and the 
defeated Democratio aspirant. 
A personal vendetta would seem to be a 108ical ex-
planation for Rhea's bolt and some attributed his action 
to this motive. Rhea, seemingly assured of the nomination 
a few months before, had seen a man, much younger than 
htmself, snatch from his hands a prize he l~d been seeking 
for twenty years. This would be enough to embitter many 
persons. But the vendetta theory is apparently contradictec 
19Interview with Trout. 
20Joseph Cambron to Mary Swope, October 15, 1935, Swope 
Collection. 
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in a letter by Rhea to an old friend and political advisor. 
In this letter, Rhea, in a philosophical manner, stated: 
Of course I wa~~ disappointed at the 
result of the final primar~, but such 
1s life and I am proud to belong to a 
race able to bear with perfect equa-
nimity any adversity as it comes. 21 
Irhis letter does not negate entirely the possibility that 
Rhea simply sought revenge, but it does suggest that Rhea 
had not been so embittered by the results of the primary 
oontests that he struck out at Chandler blindly and with-
out reason. 
The possibility that Rhea was truly concerned about 
the well-being of the party cannot be discounted. His 
assooiation with the Demooratio party had been a long and 
ardent one. Thus, he may have convinced himself, after 
suffering a heart breaking defeat, that he was acting in 
the welfare of the party. 
Whether Rhea aoted out of animosity, concern for the 
party, or because of a politioal bargain, his "last hour 
bolt,tt as one influential politician aptly stated it, 
"destroyed all of his political usefulness."22 Never 
again would he possess the power and influence that was 
his during the Laffoon administration. 
The effect of the "bolt" on the voting of a~y large 
segment of the population is questionable. The defection 
21Thomas Rhea to Urey Woodeor., September 23, 1935, 
Woodson Papers. 
22Urey 'fJoodson to Colonel Hartfield J November 30, 
1935, woodson Papers. 
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of Rhea supporters to the side of Swope was not universal. 
Many of the county politicians, around whom Rhea hac built 
his primary organization, sensed the popular support given 
Chandler and did not follow the lead of Laffoon or Rhea. 
As Chandler traveled around the state campaigning, many of 
the men who harl formerly aligned themselves with Rhea were 
observed to be sitting with Chandler on the speai{ers 
platform and many publicly endorsed Chandler. 23 The party 
bolt was further handicapped by the lack of a strong 
leader. Laffoon never endorsed Swope dIrectly and Rhea 
delayed until the day before the election. The last hour 
endorsement of Swope came too late to produce a large 
defection within the party-
The Rhea bolt did not develop without attempts at 
conciliation. These efforts, because of the source from 
which they originated, only served to intensify the dif-
ferences between the two factions and provide the Repub-
lican candidate with an issue. It will be recalled tl~t 
the national administration had taken an active interest 
in the action of the Democratic Executive Committee prior 
to its calling of a convention, a step opposed by the 
Roosevelt Administration. This interest was generated by 
the fact that the New Deal faced its first major election 
test in 1936. Kentucky, as the only state in the union 
holding a major election in 1935, was marked by both Demo-
cratic and Republican national leaders as a crucial battle 
23courier-Journal, October 20, 1935, p. 111-
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ground. A Democratic victory in Kentucky's gubernatorial 
election would be viewed as an endorsement of the Roosevelt 
policies. Likewise, the Republicans sought to use a vic-
tory as an incication of public rejection of the New Deal 
programs. Frustr~ting the desires of Democrats at the 
national level was the fact that the ranks of Kentucky's 
party were divided by factional fighting. 
During the primary campaigns Rhea had accused the 
Roosevelt administration of favoring Chandler. Even if 
Rhea was correct in his assertions, it was extremely im-
politic to state them publicly, for the national adminis-
tration was generally considered to be popular in the 
state. 24 Rhea asserted that the attitude of the national 
administration was the product of misleaCing and false 
information given by Bingham and his followers. Rhea 
argued that the Roosevelt administration's support of the 
anti-administration group in Kentucky had been demon-
strated by the appointment of John Y. Brown, an avowed 
anti-administration supporter, to a federal position.25 
Rhea's assertions were given added weight when Brown, 
speaking on behalf of Chandler's candidacy, stated repeat-
edly that he knew that the President did not want Rhea 
nominated and that if the President were a resident of 
24urey Woodson to Homer Cummings, AUGust Ih, 1935, 
Wood son Papers. 
25Lexington Herald, April 14, 1935, p. 4. 
26 Kentucky he would vote against Rhea's nomination. 
Rhea was partiew.arly resentful about the action of 
the Imtiona1 administration because of what appeared to him 
to be the ingratitude of the Roosevelt group. It had been 
largely the wo»k of Rhea which won the vote of the Kentucky 
delegation for Roosevelt in the 1932 no~atlng convention. 
While Rhea had been a active supporter of Roosevelt, Lan 
Talbot, Ben Johnson and Chandler had supported Al Smith and 
opposed Roosevelt's nomination. In spite of their opposi-
tion, Rhea, with the aid of Laffoon and others. succeeded 
in seeuri~ a delegation which was instructed for Roose-
velt.27 Atterwa~ds, at the Chicago convention, Chandler 
and Talbot once aea1n worked to defeat Roosevelt's nomina-
tion. However, Rhea successfully held the Kentucky delega-
tion in line for the future president. 28 
After the run-ott primary, the national administration 
expressed more openly its interest in the election. Im-
mediately after the election, Chandler visited Washington, 
where he was promised the aid of the national party by its 
chairman. Postmaster General James F&rley.29 To assist 
Chandler in his campaign Farley visited Louisville on 
26Urey ~Joodson to Colonel Hartfield, September 28, 
1935. Woodson Papers. 
27Urey Woodson to James A. Farley, February 2, 1935, 
Woodson Papers. 
28urey Woodson to L'sniel Roper, July 12, 19.35, \voodson 
Papers. 
29Courier-Journal, September 17, 1935, p. 1. 
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October;. If.!hile in the ci ty Farle;y, addressing the Young 
L>emocrats, urged unity l.dthin the state t s LemocrlJtic Party 
during the gubernatorial campaign and stressed the impor-
tance of the Kentucky election in the c3es of political 
observers at t~~national level. 3D 
Farley's trip was made on the heels of a disastrous 
attempt at conciliation by trw President of the United 
States. The President, on September 27, embarked on a 
transoontinental tour of the country. The evening before 
departing, in an effort to soothe dissension, he had in-
vited Rhea, Laffoon and Chandler to ride with him on his 
train from Cinoinnati to North Vernon, Indiana. The Pres-
ident's inviation was refused by both Rhea and Laffoon. 
In sending the request to the Governor, the President's 
secretary, Marvin McIntyre, a Kentuokian and one of those 
aooused of transmitting talse information to the President, 
had not included the Governor's name, simply stating that 
the President invites "you, Chandler and Rhea to board the 
train."31 Latfoon deolared that he had not been invited 
and refused to go even after McIntyre attempted to appease 
Laffoon by personally phoning an invitation. 
One newspaper stated that Rhea in replying to the 
inv1tation indioated: 
That since the President had olosed 
the door of the \>Jhi te House to him 
301bid., October 6, 193$, p. 1. 
31Cincinnati Enquirer, September 28, 1935, p. Lt.. 
for seven months, he saw no reason 
why he should come to Ohio to greet 
~~. Roosevelt.32 
He further asserted that the President's mind had been 
poisoned against him by his Kentucky-born secretary.33 
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Only Chandler aooepted the invitation, but his meeting 
with the President occurred with much oonfusion and dis-
order. The whole meeting took on aspeots of a situation 
oomedy. As Chandler rushed to meet the President's train 
he accidentally ran into a policeman "who not reoognizing 
this slim and very young man as even so muoh as a con-
stable, much less a prospective governor, refused to let 
him pass."34 While Chandler was being detained, the Pres-
ident and other dignitaries were posed for the traditional 
hearty greeting given to fellow puty members. By the time 
Chandler had been identified to the satisfaction of the 
policemen, the president, who had waited with anxious 
reporters for almost a halt an hour, had returned to his 
private car. 35 Thus, the President's role as peacemaker 
had not only tailed to foster an aooord, but had acoentu-
ated the split beyond the hope of healing. 
32!.E.!2.. 
33Urey Woodson to Colonel Hartfield, September 28, 
1935; Colonel Hartfield to Urey \tloodson, September 30, 
193.5, 'lfloodson Papers. In this exchange of letters both 
men agree that Rhea had basis for his feelings. \-!oodson 
states that McIntyre had been boasting a few months earlier 
that Rhea would not be elected if nominated. 
34Cino1nnati Enquirer, September 28, 1935, p. I}. 
35l!?!.9.. 
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The Roosevelt administration also endeavored through 
indirect measures to aid the Democratio nominee. A few 
days before the general election, it was disclosed that 
letters of solicitation had been mailed to beneficiaries of 
federal relief funds in Kentucky. Sent from Washington, 
these letters taotfully advised their reCipients that the 
continuation of New Deal benefits depended upon the elec-
tion of Chandler. 36 This type of activity, which became 
notorious in the 1938 senatorial campaign between Chandler 
and Barkley, does not appear to have been used extensively 
in 1935. One reason for this was that the federal relief 
agencies were not sufficiently organized in 1935 to exer-
cise a great deal of power.37 
Swope, on learning of the letters, Charged that the 
federal authorities were trying to coerce Kentucky relief 
clients into vottng for Chandler. 38 The effect of the 
letters on voters who received them is impossible to as-
oertain. The effect of their disclosure on the voting of 
the general public was probably negligible because of the 
late date on which they were made public. 
The Roosevelt adndnistration aided Chandler's can-
dldacy in yet another way_ The Democratic nominee 
possessed an asset in the popularity of the New Deal and 
36Ibid., November 4, 1935, p. 1. 
37Intervlew with Trout. 
38aerald Postt November 2, 193$, p. 1. 
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the President in the state. In his canpnien addresses, he 
noted often tlle impol,tance of his election to the Hoosevelt 
prog:ram. He lmrned all Democrats that if Swope was elected 
"he would be HOrking all next year to breakdown the Roose-
velt Administration/,39 That 'tmuld Plean, Chand Ie 1· stated. 
ttthe obstruction of social security and old-age pension 
legislation in Kentucky.n40 
Republicans, recognizing the advantage the Democrats 
enjoyed in the popularity of the national administration, 
sought to avoid the topic of the New Deal. "Kentucky needs 
a change. state issues are the only issues that should be 
discussed," one Republican paper declared.4l Adhering to 
this strategy, Swope confined his remarks to state problems 
and issues. The only issue he might have been able to use 
against the Roosevelt administration was that of the 
letters to the relief clients. But it developed too late 
in the campaign to be employed effectively by the Repub-
lican candidate. 
Swope also sought to make an issue out of Chandler's 
assessment of state employees. During the primary cam-
paigns the Demooratic nominee had repeatedly accused Rhea 
of assessing state employees for campaign funds. Most 
voters, accustomed to this practice, gave little heed to 
39Courier-Journal, October 2, 1935, p. 2. 
40Lexington Herald, October 2'(, 1935, p. 3. 
!tlThe Messenger, September 22, 193.5, clipping in 
Swope Scrapbooks. 
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Chandler's assertions.42 A£ter securine the nomination in 
the run-off primary, Chandler, in need of funds, also 
solicited fro~ those on the state's payroll what were 
termed "contributions." His ef£orts at assessment might 
have viewed in the same philosophical manner, except for 
two things. The first factor to discredit Chandler's 
activities was the pUblication on September 6, of a report 
by the office of the State Examiner and Inspector which 
dealt with the costly mismanagement o£ the state Highway 
Department. On the bas is of a comple te a ud i t of the 
department's expenditures during the period from April, 
1931 to April 1, 1935, the report asserted that: 
The policy of us ing the highway depart-
ment as a political machine during the 
last fifteen years undoubtedly has cost 
the state many millions of dollars that 
might have been applied under a more 
efficient non-political system of opera-
tions, to the building and maintenance 
of hundreds of miles ~re of needed roads 
throughout the state.43 
The report indicated that hlgi:lway department had become 
the center of assessment activities. 
Chandler's activities in this area were made even 
more damaging by the fact that thl'oughout the primary 
contests he had repeatedly promised that if elected he 
would urge the passage of a law "forbidding the UBe of 
taxpayers' money for political purposes.n44 Commenting on 
42lnterview with Trout. 
43coUI'ier-Journal, September ~(, 1935, p. 1. 
44Ibid., July 12, 1935, p. 11. 
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Chandler I S contradictory behavior, one paper stated: "Mr. 
Chandler condemned and pledged himself against a practice 
he knew was a common custom in politics. If he saw fit to 
commit himself against it, he should have stuck by his com-
m! tment ... 45 
Swope denounced Chandler's action, implying that he 
was a man whose word could not be trusted and thus was not 
fit to be governor. Swope's denunciations were highlighted 
by the publication of some of the letters sent out by the 
Chandler organization. These letters noted the organiza-
tion's urgent need for financial resources. They did point 
out that Chandler had announced a policy "opposing the 
levying upon officials and employees of the state for cam-
It paign funds, but concluded with the statement that: 
We are confident that your interest in 
the success of the State Democratic 
ticket in November is such that you will 
be glad to share in the burden of this 
campaign •••• 46 
The letters also reminded the reCipients that the custom 
was for employees and officials to contribute "at least two 
per cent of their annual salary."47 
Chandler answered Swope by drawing attention to that 
part ot the letter which noted his opposition to assess-
ment. Frederick Wallis, who had become Chandler's finance 
chairman and mailed the letters, issued a statement in 
45Herald Pos t, October 27, 1935, p. Ji .• 
46A. B. Chandler to Jeanne Searcy, Swope Collection. 
l~71.lli. 
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which he declared that the solicitations were not assess-
ments because they were not compulsory. 48 Chandler also 
tried to offset Swope's charges by asserting that attempts 
were being made to assess employees of the highway depart-
ment for the benefit of swope.49 Although Swope denounced 
Chandlerts aocusations as "an infamous and deliberate 
talsehood,n50 such action would have been normal it an 
agreement had been reaohed between Rhea and the Republican 
nominee.5l 
Federal involvement in the election and the contro-
versy over the assessment of state employees highlighted 
the gubernatorial election, which lacked the excitement ot 
the Democratic primaries. Little real difterence existed 
in the platforms of the two candidates. Swope did attempt 
to turn the sales tax issue to his own advantage by de-
olaring that Chandler had ignored an opportunity to repeal 
the sales tax when he had called the special session ot the 
General Assembly. Chandler in turn held Swope accountable 
tor the support given the sales tax by Republicans in the 
legislature. Based on little more than thin air, these 
charges aroused little public interest. 
Both candidates engaged in hard-tought campaigns. 
"Chandler delivered one hundred and three speeches in 
48Lexington Herald, October 23. 1935, p. 1. 
49Cincinnati Enquirer, October 23, 1935, p. 1. 
50Lexlnston Leader, october 24, 1935, p. 1. 
5lInterview with Trout. 
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seventy-two counties while Swope delivered ninety speeches 
in eighty-two counties."52 Swope and the Democratic candi-
date differed sharply in their approach to public addresses. 
Swope generally spoke longer than Chandler and in a more 
concise arld logical manner than the L'emoorat1c nominee. A 
more flamboyant speaker, Chandler's delivery was less 
formal. 
The campaign did not lack the jesting which 1s a part 
of many political contests. Chandler, in allusion to 
Swope's eiven name, referred to the Republican nominee on 
many occas ions as "his majesty, the king. tt Stating that 
he knew Chandler would "pull that one," Swope humorously 
returned Chandler's political barb by declaring: 
You know that every court has some 
t:ood-natured simpleton around to 
laugh, dance and sing. "lhen I'm 
elected Governor I will let him 
entertain o~e and all with his song 
and dances .;,3 
The gubernatorial campaign ended on the evening of 
November 4, 1935. Election day dawned rainy and overcast 
across the state. Although inclement weather is usually a 
precursor of a small vote, this was not the case in 1935, 
when over a million voters went to the polls to express 
their sentiments. This was the largest vote ever cast in 
Kentucky's history. Winning the election, Chandler 
received a vote of 556,262, whereas Svlope received 461,101+. 
52Courier-Journal. November 3, 1935. p. 1. 
53Lexlngton Leader, october 6, 1935, p. 1. 
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As is indicated in the illustration on the following 
page, Chandler received majorities in seventy-seven coun-
ties and Swope in forty-three counties. Chandler's 
strength was concentrated primarily in a large part of the 
Bluegrass, and in Western, Northern and Southeastern 
Kentucky. Of course, the Bluegrass region am~ "!estern 
Kentucky had always been centers of l'emocratic strength. 
The I:emocNl.tic Party had made inroads into Southeastern 
Kentucky in the early years of the depression. Many of the 
counties in this area, such as Leslie and Perr~, had a 
traditional attachment to the Republioan Party. Chandler's 
candidacy in the region was aided by the United Mine 
vJorkers and the popularity of the Ne"w Deal. On October 10, 
the president of Kentucky's union hao in announcing the 
endorsement of Chandler stated: 
Chandler was endorsed because of the 
friendly attitude of President Roose-
velt and the national administration 
toward labor throughout the nation 
and also because of Chandler's record 
on labor legislation while he served 
in the state senate and as lieutenant 
governor. 54 
It was also stated that Swope "was unfriendly to organized 
labor and that while a member of the Sixty-Sixth Congress 
he consistently voted against and opposed labor measures."5S 
On behalf of Chandler's candidacy, Jotm L. Lewis. national 
president of the Uni ted Hine Workers of America, came to 
54Lexington Herald, October 8, 1935, p. 1. 
55!£!.<!. 
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Kentucky, muoh of the northeastern region and in a number 
of counties in the Pennyroyal region. He also picked up 
some support in the Bluegrass region, principally in his 
home county of Fayette. Actually, Swope did much better 
than hac the Republican candidate in the 1931 gubernatorial 
election. He carried eleven counties which the 1931 candi-
date did not carry and lost only seven of those carriec by 
the Republican candidate that year. Furthermore, he picked 
up sixteen counties lost by Hoover in 1932 and lost only 
one. For the mDst part, Swope carried those regions, such 
as South-Central Kentucky, which were traditional Repub-
lican areas. 
By and large, Chandler oarried the wealthy counties in 
the state. Of those with property values of less than 
twenty dollars per acre, Chandler carried twenty and Swope 
thirty_one. 60 The Democratic nominee's strength in the 
wealthier regions of the state is demonstrated by the fact 
that of the counties with property values ranging from 
twenty to fifty dollars per acre Chandler carried forty-two 
and Swope eight. Likewise, Chandler oarried sixteen coun-
ties with property values over fifty dollars per acre, 
whereas Swope carried three. 61 This type of distribution 
was not uncommon, for Republican strength in the state 
rested in many of the poorer regions. This had been one 




factor in S~lope' s denunication of the use of federal relief 
rolls by the Chandler forces. It was feared that this in-
fluence would be greatest on those counties which had the 
f~eatest proportion of the population as reCipients of 
governmental rellef. 62 This was not borne out in the 1935 
election. Instead of repudiating their Republicanism many 
counties gave Swope a gree.ter percentage of their votes 
than they had given the 1932 Republican presidential can-
didate. For example, in Jackson County the vote rose from 
8It.S per cent Republican to 88.8 per cent. Increases were 
also found in Leslie, Laurel, Casey, Martin, McCreary, 
Metcalfe, Monroe, Owsley, and Russell counties. A decrease 
in Republican votes came primarily in those counties such 
as Harlan, Letcher and Perry where the voting was affected 
by union membership. 
The 1935 election did not differ from earlier and 
later elections in the state during the 1930's. One writer 
has pointed out that "in eight statewide elections from 
1930 to 1940 eighty-seven counties, or 72.5 per cent of all 
the 120 counties in Kentucky followed their normal party 
pattern in every lnstance."63 However, the depression had 
altered voting in the coal areas and in the urban areas. 
In the former some party change was made and in the latter 
the Demncratic Party found its greatest support. Chandler 
carried all of the metropolitan centers except for the 
62Shannon, A fecade 01' Change, p. 5. 
63 ill.9.., p. Lj .• 
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Lexin~ton area, which supported its favorite son, the Re-
publican candidate. 
Negro voting does not appear to have been extremely 
significant in the election. In over half of the counties 
in the state Negroes made up less than five per cent of 
the population. Of these Chandler and Swope each carried 
thirty-two. However, of those counties with Negro popula-
tions of over five per cent Chandler carried forty-two and 
Swope only ten. This rightly indicates that the Lemo-
cratic candidate received greater support in those areas 
which contained a large number of Negroes. But this does 
not necessarily indicate that a switch had occurred in 
Negro voting as a result of the New Veal. In Kentucky, 
the Democratio Party's strength had been located in regions 
such as the central Bluegrass and Jackson Purcr~se areas 
whioh had fairly large Negro populations. On the other 
hand, a great deal of Republican strength lay in areas with 
smaller Negro populations. Th1rteen counties altered their 
traditional vot1ng patterns in 1935. Of this number only 
five had Negro populations of over five per cent. Two of 
these counties, Madison and Taylor, were oarried by Swope. 
However, there is one thing which suggests that the ljemo-
cratic Party increased its support among Negroes as early 
as 1931. The cOlmty which bad the largest percentage of 
Negro population was Christian with 30.4 per cent. From 
the time of Reconstruction to 1931 the county had consist-
ently voted Republican. But in 1931 and in 1935 the 
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county went temocratic. This indicates that the New Leal 
and the Depression had possibly effected a change in Negro 
voting in the state. It thus appears that the Ner,ro vote 
was probably of Breatest benefit to tl~e I)emocratic candi-
date. 
Chandler's victory was the result of many factors. 
One angry Republican paper unrealisticallJ' charged that 
the G. 0. p. lost because its members failed to face "the 
issue." "This issue," the paper asserted, "was the admin-
istration of Governor Laffoon with all its failures and its 
mistakes, and the 'New Leal at v:ashington. u64 This writer 
failed to admit, or perhaps recognize that Swope faced 
overwhelming obstacles in his campaign to win the election. 
The greatest obstacle he faced with the belief that 
somehow Republicans were responsible for the depression. 
What was worse for him was that he had to fight this idea 
in a state that was predominantly Democratic. Related to 
this was the fact that Roosevelt and the New Veal were 
extremely popular in the state. Vith the support of the 
national administration, Chandler became the recipient of 
much of this popular support. 
Cormected with the New Leal were two proposed amend-
ments to the state constitution. The first amendment to 
be voted on was one which would permit the legislature to 
enact legislation to provide for old-age pensions. Since 
64Mt. sterlIng Gazette and Kentucky Courier, November 
8, 1935, clipping in Swope Scrapbooks. 
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both candidates endorsed the amendment, there was little 
controversy raised over the issue. However, great interest 
was shown in the proposal by the older citizens in the 
stat.e who turned out in large numbers on election day to 
vote on the amendment. 65 
The other amendment submitted to the people dealt with 
the question of whether the state would remove or retain 
its prohibition amendment to state constitution. In 1919, 
when the prohibition cause was at its peak, Kentucky had 
adopted a prohibition amendment to its Constitution. When 
prohibition was abolished nationally, Kentucky's legis-
lature voted to submit to the people the question of 
whether the state's dry amendment should be retained. Al-
though neither candidate publicly expressed his sentiment 
on the subject, interest was aroused by the campaigning of 
opponents and proponents of the measure. Both the old-age 
amendment and that dealing with prohibition were factors in 
the large vote in the general election.66 
Chandler's victory was also, in a large measure, a 
personal victory. He possessed great popular appeal for 
Kentuckians in the 1930's. His opposition to the sales tax 
had earned him many supporters. And his action in calling 
the special session of th.e legislature to enact a primary 
65urey vJoodson to Samuel Blythe, November 6, 1935, 
\IIJoodson Papers. 
66Courier-Journal, November 8-9, 1935, p. 1. The vote 
on the prohibition amendment was 376,116 for and 285,11l0 
aBainst. The old-age amendment was passed with a 600,000 
maj ority. 
law made him a proven man of action. In both of these 
fights, Chandler appeared as the champion of popular gov-
ernment and the poor. 
Of great importance in Chandler's victory was the sup-
port given him by various organizations and interest 
groups. He received the assistance of various labor organ-
izations such as the United Mine Workers, many Railroad 
Brotherhoods and the state Federation of Labor. In addi-
tion he received the support of business. Kentucky's 
Retail Merchants Association had been one of the earliest 
supporters of Chandler's candidacy. The help of this group 
was of particular importance in Northern Kentucky and the 
Louisville area. 
Confronted by the opposition of organized labor, many 
business leaders, the national administration, and Chand-
ler's own popular! ty, Swope was defeated. It is doubtful 
that any Republican candidate could have done better than 
Swope. It has already been noted that he achieved greater 
success than had other Republicans candidates in the state 
in that decade. Chandler enjoyed all of the advantages 
and he wisely used them. 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
Chandler's election as governor marked the end of one 
of the most exoiting politioal contests in Kentucky's 
history. The reasons for his viotory are many_ One of 
the most important factors in his suooessful bid for the 
gubernatorial election was the depression and the eoonomio 
hardships whioh many people suffered as a result of it. 
Luring this period, as the basic tenets of Amerioan society 
were being given their greatest trial, Kentuokians showed a 
tremendous interest in political affairs. This interest 
was demonstrated in record-breaking turnouts on election 
days. Although Republican voters also showed a greater 
interest in political questions, the increase was of great-
est benefit to the Demooratic Party and its candidate. 
Because many people blamed the Republioan Party for the 
depression the Demooratio party was looked upon with new 
and greater favor. However, this merely added to the 
majority the Democratic Party had held in the state sinoe 
the Civil \\Jar. 
Another factor related to the depression which played 
a major part in Chandler's victory, was the New 1.eal pro-
gram of the Roosevelt ad~nistration. Such measures as 
old-age assistance and social security were extremely 
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popular in the state. Although Swope, the G.O.P. candidate 
endorsed these and other New Deal measures, Chandler en-
joyed the advantaGe of representing the political party 
that was most responsible for them. 
The prestige and popularity of the President in the 
state was also of great value to Chandler. Roosevelt's 
endorsement and active support probably gained for Chandler 
many votes. The significance of this factor is indicated 
by Swope's avoidance of any discussion of the national 
administration and by his call for a concentration on the 
problems of the state. 
The Roosevelt administration gave more than indirect 
support to Chandler. Officials, such as Postmaster General 
Farley, visited Kentucky on behalf of trw Democratic guber-
natorial candidate. In addition, Senators Barkley and M. 
M. Logan spoke throughout the state, urging the election of 
Chandler. Further assistance was rendered by the Roosevelt 
administration in the form of letters to Kentuckians who 
were on national welfare rolls. These letters implied that 
the continuation of New Veal programs depended on Chand-
ler's election. The assistance and influence of the Roose-
velt administration was thus one of the most significant 
factors in Chandler's victory over the Republican candi-
date. But it can also be attributed as a factor in his 
defeat of Rhea. It was the contention of the Rhea forces 
that Roosevelt supported Chandler in the primary contests. 
Al though there is little evidence of this, the charge did 
not harm Chandler. On the oontrary, the idea that the 
President favored Chandler probably aided him. 
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Part of Chandler's sucoess oan be attributed to the 
support given him by l~bor and business organizations in 
the state. Businessmen who opposed the sales tax were 
early supporters of the Demooratic candidate. And virtu-
ally all the large labor organizations endorsed Chandler's 
oandidacy. Their in£luence was seen in the votes of the 
industrial areas and in the coal-mining district of south-
eastern Kentuoky. 
The nature of Kentuoky politics from 1931 to 1935 was 
also a major oause of Chandler's election. The extreme 
factionalism of l;emocratic politics in this period at-
tracted widespread attention. ~nis undoubtedly increased 
voter participation, particularly in the primary elections. 
Continually during this period the Laffoon-Rhea faction of 
the party advooated measures wlrlch were counter to public 
sentiment. In eaoh oase, Chandler acourately sensing 
public reaction, gave his support to the more popular 
cause. 
In 1931 Chandler was an obsoure political figure. By 
1935 he was among the best known men of the state. Early 
in the Laffoon administration, dIfferences which occurred 
during the nominating convention reappeared. Soon Chand-
ler emerged as the anti-administration leader. His oppo-
sition to tne sales tax and his role in the primary contro-
versy mB.de him the best candidate the anti-administration 
faction could run. It also accounted for his popularity 
with voters and for a great many of the votes he received 
in the primary elections and in the general election. 
Chandler's term as governor proved to be one of the 
most productive in the state's history. True to his cam-
paign promises he reorganized the state government along 
more effioient lines suggested by a team of experts, and 
oalled a special session of the General Assembly which re-
pealed the sales tax. Furthermore, he reduced the state's 
debt while providing for the neoessary relief measures. 
Although the factionalism within the Democratio Party 
was not ended in 1935, not since that year has it been so 
intense or disruptive. In 1938 Chandler alienated many in 
the party by opposing Barkley for the senatorial nomina-
tion. The following year, Keen Johnson, who was largely 
acceptable to both groups, won the gubernatorial nomina-
tion. 
Despite the fact that the election did not end com-
pletely the factionalism, it did signal the final death of 
bi-partisan rule. Laffoon, after his break with many of 
his own party members, had once again sought the aid of 
Republicans. This type of system was thoroughly discred-
ited and has not reappeared. 
The 1935 gubernatorial election was significant be-
cause it saw the emergence of a new type of leadership. 
Chandler represented a dynamic, youthful type of public 
official who appeared able to cope with the monumental 
problems facine the society. Because of him, the people of 
the state v!Ould always make their partyts political nomiroa-
tion. Even more persuasive to mIDly voters, was the fact 
that he had opposed the sales tax before its passage and 
thus appeared a champion of the poor and downtrodden. Al-
though his election appeared to many as a Victory for the 
laborer, farmer and coal miner, it was also a victory for 
many business interests which opposed the sales tax. 
Few political contests in the state's lustory can 
equal the 1935 election in controversy, colorfulness or 




Baldwin, "111l1am Edward (ed.). Carroll's Kentucky 
Statutes. Louisville: The Standard Printing Co., 
1930. 
Commonwealth of Kentucky. 
resentatlves Extraord ar 
,e state Journal Company, 
ort: 
ort: 
____ ~~~~~~--~~~. Journal of the KentuckI Senate 
Regular Session 193b.. Frankfort: The state Journa! 
Company, 1934. 
D. S. Bureau of Census. Seventeenth Census of the United 
states: 1940. A~lc~ure, Vols. I, If. Washington, t.e., Government rint g Office, 1940. 
U. S. Bureau of Census. Seventeenth Census of the United 
States: 1940. population, ¥ols. I, II. Washington, 
I.C., Government Print ng Of lee, 1940. 
D. S. Bureau of Census. Seventeenth Census of the United 
states: 1940, Housing, Vols. I, II. Washlngton, 
L. c., Government printing Office, 1940. 
Books 
baylor', Orval li. ..;. I;sn Talbot Champion 01 uood Govern-
ment Louisville: Kentucky .Printin'c~ Corporation, 
19i.l-2. 
l-'er:.ton, John H. Politics In the Border states New 
Orleans: The Hauser Press, 1957. 
.Jewell, Halco1m. Kentucky Vote,,! 
of Kentucky Press, 1963. 
Lexin~ton: University 
Karl', Judge Charles {cd.). lii:::tory of Ker1tucky 
The Arnerlcan His t or ic£':1 Society, 1922. 
Chicago: 
Merl'iam, Charles Edward, Overacker, Louise. Primary 
Elections Chicago: The tni .crsity of' Chicago 
Press, 1928,. 
ShanLon, Jasper. A recade of Change in Kentucky Politics 
Lex:tnt~ton: 'Universit;i of Kentucky Presf:, 191+.3. 
Shannon, J"aspel
'
, and ~;cc;uo'wl1, Rut~l. IJresidentia1 Politics 
in Kl;mtucky, 1824.-1948 LexinGton: University of 
r:entuclk~y 1)l"088, 1950. 
Tapp, Hanmleton. ~A-'~~~~~~~~ ____ ~~~-T~~ __ ~~ 
Hopkinsville: 9.+5. 
'"dllis, George Lee. Kentucky l ... emocrsc;; Louisville: 
temocratic Historical Society, 1935. 
Periodicals 
Cincinnati Enquirer, 1934-1935. 
jIbe Corbin ~'lmes, 1935. 
Courier-Journal, 1931-1935. 
Harlan Daily Enterprise, 1935. 
Harrodsburg Herald, 1934-1935. 
Henderson Morning Gleaner, 1935. 
~ Louisville Herald Post, 1931, 1935. 
~ Stanford Interior Standard, 1935. 
~ Bardsto"tm Kentucky Stanford. 1935. 
Lexington Herald. 1931, 1934-1935. 
Lexington Leader. 1934-1935. 
!h! Greensburg Record Herald. 1935. 
Richmond Laily Register. 1935. 
~ Covington Times-Star. 1935. 
other Sources 
148 
¥ark Ethridge to Olivia Frederick, April 15, 1966, in the 
possession of the author. 
ROlster v. Brock, Larfoon v. Rankin, 258 Ky. 152, 79 S.W. 
(2d) 707 (1935). 
Personal Interview with A~bert B. Chandler, Lexington, 
Kentucky, December 6, 1965. 
Personal Interviews with Clay Wade Bailey, Frankfort, 
KentuCi{Y, February 21, 1966, June 1, 1966, June 6, 
1966. 
Personal Interview with Elam Huddleston, Louisville, 
Kentucky, June 18, 1966. 
Personal Interview with AlleD Trout, Frankfort, 
Kentucky, May 5, 1966. 
Swope Collection, Archives Division, Margaret I. King 
Library, University of Kentucky. 
Swope Scrapbooks, Archives Division, Margaret I. King 
Library, University of Kentucky. 
Thomas Underwood Collection, Archives Division, 
Margaret I. King Library, University of Kentucky. 
Urey Woodson Collection. Archives Division, Margaret I. 
King Library, University of Kentucky. 
